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Say on Pay's Bundling Problems
Andrew C.W Lund'
The newly enacted federal Say on Pay rule will require public firms to
periodically provide shareholders with an opportunity to cast an advisory vote
regardingits most recentyears executive compensation. Like other efforts to increase
shareholderpower, Say on Pay has attractedcriticism from those who fear that
so empowering shareholders will harm firms. There may be much to be saidfor
those criticisms, but this Article instead offers a critique of Say on Pay internal
to the shareholderempowerment movement. The problem with Say on Pay is that
its ex post nature neuters its ability to influence executive pay at high-performing
firms. This hypothesis has been borne out by the experience with Say on Pay in the
UK where a mandatory version has been in effect for seven years. There, Say on
Pay resulted in compensation-relateddiscipline at poorly-performingfirms, but
not at high-performingfirms. This disparity appears to be not entirely or even
sigmfcantly driven by shareholderpreferences or monitoring costs. Alternatively,
this Article suggests that Say on Paysuffers from the bundling ofperceivedcollateral
costs insofar as shareholders reasonablyfear offending executives via an adverse
Say on Pay vote. Thoseproblems arenaturally more significantathigh-performing
firms where the potentially offended executives are believed to be more valuable.
This Article suggests that the bundlingproblems can be mitigatedby switchingfrom
an ex post to an ex ante vote andprovides afirst attemptat a CEO Compensation
Planapprovalrequirement.
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INTRODUCTION

As

practices have become more controversial,
compensation
executive
for a larger shareholder role in pay decisions at public
many
have called
firms. That increased power was officially granted through a federal law
requiring public companies to submit to shareholder "Say on Pay"-a
non-binding vote by which shareholders may register their disapproval of
the previous year's executive pay arrangements-no less frequently than
once every three years.' To this point, Say on Pay has been subjected to a
moderate amount of criticism,' the majority of which reflects the fault lines
in the more general debate over increasing shareholder power. This Article
offers a different kind of critique, contending that Say on Pay is a relatively
unattractive structurefor establishing that power.The expost nature of the Say
on Pay vote engenders significant bundling issues that distort shareholder
decisionmaking regarding optimal pay structures, resulting in too little
discipline at high-performing firms. Those who want shareholders to play
an advisory role with respect to executive pay, should want such power to
be exercised prior to the pay being decided and awarded. While remaining
agnostic about the propriety of increasing Say on Pay, this Article develops
2 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. i ii§951(a)(i), 12 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). Section 951 of Dodd-Frank also requires firms to
submit to a non-binding shareholder vote on the frequency of the Say on Pay vote, e.g., once
every either one, two or three years, with that vote occurring no less frequently than once
every six years. Id. § 951(a)(2). Say on Pay has been required for all Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) participants since its inception. See American Recovery and Reinvestment
203,

Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1'1-5,

§ 7001,

123 Stat. 115, 519-20 (2009). All Say on Pay iterations

subject to shareholder vote the compensation of the executives named in the firm's proxy
statement. For exposition purposes only, this Article limits its discussion of the affected executives to the CEO.
3 See infra Part l.B.
4 For more on the debate over increasing shareholder authority, see Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Essay, The Myth of the ShareholderFranchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676-82 (2007); Martin Lipton
& William Savitt, Essay, The Aany Myths of Lucian Bebhuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 733-58 (2007);
Lynn A. Stout, Essay, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REv. 789, 791-92
(2007); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The CaseforIncreasingShareholderPower, i18 HARv. L. REV. 833,835
(2005) [hereinafter Bebchuck, Shareholder Power]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy

and Shareholder Disempowerment, i19 HARv. L. REv. 1735, 1735 (2oo6); Iman Anabtawi, Some

Skepticism About IncreasingShareholderPower, 53 UCLA L. REV. 56 I, 56 1-64 (zoo6).
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one version of such an ex ante device: a requirement that shareholders
periodically cast an advisory vote on a standing "CEO Compensation Plan"
applicable to future CEO compensation arrangements.

Say on Pay reallocates power over a certain group of firm decisions,
giving public shareholders more influence over compensation matters than
ever before.' Although the vote is non-binding, experience with Say on Pay
in the UK-where it has been mandatory for the better part of a decadeand the US-where it has been adopted piecemeal, either voluntarily
or via industry-specific legislation-indicates that advisory shareholder
votes can constrain pay decisions. 6 Consequently, those who would oppose
increased shareholder power more generally have an obvious complaint
and have tended to argue most forcefully against Say on Pay.' Others
less fundamentally opposed to increased shareholder power nevertheless
have worried that compensation decisions may be a bad candidate for an
increased shareholder role, largely because of their relatively complicated,
firm-specific nature.8 In all events, the debate to this point has centered
(and understandably so) on the merits of allocating more authority to
shareholders vis-i-vis executive compensation.
Less frequently discussed is the question of how to empower
shareholders assuming they are to be empowered. This Article details the
problems created by the timing of the Say on Pay vote. Because the vote
occurs after the compensation decision is made and the relevant executives
are employed, Say on Pay is subject to potentially serious bundling issues.
That is, the specific package to be voted on-the appropriateness of pay
packages-is intertwined with other, sometimes conflicting considerations,
making the vote less indicative of voters' preferences than it might initially
seem. Shareholders who might otherwise use Say on Pay to disapprove of
past compensation arrangements must discount the expected gains from
disciplining pay by the collateral costs that such discipline might impose on
5 Previously, shareholders had no explicit role in setting executive pay. They often approved general compensation plans in order to capture valuable corporate tax benefits that
hinge on receipt of shareholder approval. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 885-86 (2007). Similarly, stock
exchange rules require that shareholders approve equity compensation plans. See infra Part
III.A. However, neither requirement, in practice, gives shareholders significant influence
over executive-specific compensation decisions. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 196 (2004)
[hereinafter BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE].

6 See infra Part I.A (Say on Pay in the UK) and notes 15-16 (advisory votes in the US).
7 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is 'Say on Pay'Justified?,REGULATION, Spring 2009, at
42,42. In addition to the threat it poses to board authority, Bainbridge criticizes Say on Pay for
solving a nonexistent problem, see id. at 42, 44, and for improperly federalizing corporate law,
see id.at 44-46. See also infra note 70.
8 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Essay, "Say on Pay": CautionaryNotes on the U.K. Experience and
the Casefor ShareholderOpt-In, 46 HARV. . ON LEGIs. 323, 325-26 (2oo9) (expressing concern
that Say on Pay may cause a wealth-decreasing homogenization of pay practices).
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managerial performance. These collateral costs are more significant because
of the expost nature of Say on Pay and the resulting potential for offending
managers through an essentially executive-specific adverse vote. As a result,
shareholders who are upset with a firm's pay practices may nevertheless
accede to objectionable compensation for fear of offending a CEO they
believe to be prospectively valuable.9 To the extent that shareholders
"fall in love" with CEOs,o the perceived potential of a particular CEO to
increase firm value is likely to outweigh all but the most extravagant pay
packages. The magnitude of this bundling effect will naturally differ based
on the expectation of future CEO performance, meaning that we should
expect Say on Pay to more heavily discipline CEOs at low-performing
firms than those at high-performing firms where the cost of potential CEO
deviation from past practice will be believed to be highest.
Perhaps mandatory Say on Pay's greatest advantage as a device for
increasing shareholder power over compensation decisions is that it has
been tried in other jurisdictions," and on a voluntary basis in the US, and
it has yet to produce significant negative consequences. 2 The evidence is
decidedly mixed, however, as to how much Say on Pay has actually improved
pay practices. In fact, the clearest consequence of Say on Pay in the UK has
been a significant shift in pay only at poorly performing firms."
Admittedly, the devil one knows may be better than the alternative
one does not. This perhaps explains the near-universal acceptance of
Say on Pay as the sole vehicle through which shareholder power over
compensation is to be increased. This Article proposes a different sort of
mechanism-an ex ante CEO Compensation Plan approval requirement.
Happily, this mechanism also has a non-disastrous historical analogthe current exchange listing requirements mandating that all equity
compensation plans be pre-approved by shareholders." Under a CEO
Compensation Plan approval rule, public firms would be required to obtain
shareholder approval of the parameters within which future CEOs could
be paid. The approval would have to occur prior to the public recruiting of
a new CEO to solve for bundling problems similar to those created by Say
on Pay. Shareholders would be free to impose as many or as few limitations

9 Albeit not as valuable as he or she would be at a different compensation level.
1o For more on this phenomenon, see RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE
SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs, at x-xi (2002); see infra notes 165-79.
II See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: InternationalPerspective on the
Effectiveness of IncreasedShareholderPower,3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. I, 17 (2oo8) (noting Say on Pay's
adoption in Sweden); Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive
Law andCEOCompensation,35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 226-36 (2008) (describing Say on Pay's adop-

tion in the United Kingdom and Australia).
12 See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Part III.A.
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on prospective pay arrangements as they felt prudent. Finally, the approval
would be advisory-just like Say on Pay-to mitigate any pathologies
inherent to shareholder voting.
Part Idiscusses Say on Payas recently enacted. It describes the experience
with a similar Say on Pay rule enacted in the UK and voluntary Say on Pay
votes in the US. Part II describes the problems created by Say on Pay's ex
post nature, and concludes that a significant number of firms will not be
disciplined by the measure. Part III develops the CEO Compensation Plan
approval rule as an alternative mechanism that would provide discipline
in many of the cases where Say on Pay would not. This Article concludes
that most participants in the debate over increased shareholder power in
the compensation arena should prefer the ex ante mechanism to the ex post
mechanism.

I.

SAY ON PAY

In recent years, some institutional shareholders and shareholder
advocates in the US have pushed for firm-by-firm adoption of Say on Pay."
Their efforts were met with increasing but marginal success.'" At the same
time, Congress was sporadically working on legislation that would make Say
on Pay mandatory. In 2007, Representative Frank introduced a Say on Pay
measure that passed in the House." The companion bill in the Senate was
introduced by then-Senator Obama, but failed.' 8 As part of the legislative
response to the financial crisis in early 2009, all TARP participants were
required to hold a Say on Pay vote.' 9 Later that year, Senator Schumer
introduced a Shareholder's Bill of Rights containing mandatory Say on
Pay at all public companies. 0 Thereafter, Frank, as part of a more global
financial reform package (titled the Corporate and Financial Institution
Compensation Fairness Act of 2009), introduced a similar Say on Pay
provision.2' In December 2009, the House of Representatives passed the
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 mandating Say on
15 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 338-40 (describing institutional shareholders' efforts to
force adoption of Say on Pay at various firms); Jie Cai & Ralph Walkling, Shareholders'Say on
Pay: Does it Create Value?, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 7-8),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1030925.
16 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 339-40. In the most recent proxy season, Motorola,
Inc. and Occidental Petroleum Corp., both of which had voluntarily submitted to Say on Pay,
received majority negative votes from shareholders. Erin White, Investors Start to Make Their
Voices Heardon Pay, WALL ST. J., May 1o, 201o, at B6.

17

H.R. 1257, 1 ioth Cong. (2007).
18 See S. I181, 11oth Cong. (2007).
19 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. I I1-5, § 7001, 123
Stat. 115, 519 (2oo9).
20 S. 1074, 11ith Cong. §
21

3 (2009).

H.R. 3269, 1 1ith Cong.

§2

(2009).
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Pay at all public firms." In May 2010, the Senate approved its own version
of that bill (including the Say on Pay provision), and re-titled it as the
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010.23 Finally, both houses
agreed to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (commonly referred to as "Dodd-Frank") and President Obama signed
Say on Pay into law.24
Under Say on Pay as enacted, firms will be required to hold a nonbinding vote whereby shareholders will either approve or reject the previous
year's compensation arrangements for the handful of executives whose
compensation was otherwise disclosed in the Summary Compensation
Table of the firm's proxy statement." Under current rules, these include
the principal executive officer, principal financial officer, and a firm's other
three most highly compensated executive officers. 6 Therefore, Say on
Pay usually requires shareholders to vote on the prior year's compensation
arrangements for the five most highly paid executives at a firm.27 The vote
could be held each year, every two years, or every three years, at the board's
discretion. However, the board must submit the question of frequency to
shareholders for another non-binding vote at least once every six years.28
Say on Pay votes provide a discrete means to coordinate shareholder
dissatisfaction over compensation matters. 29 Yet, because it is an advisory
vote, Say on Pay can be an effective tool for shareholders only by threatening
some sort of secondary harm on boards and executives. This threat is largely
reputational, 30 though it may include an implicit threat to subsequently
remove or vote "no" with respect to directors who have agreed or continue
22

H.R.41 73 , IIith Cong. § 2002 (2oo9); Carl Hulse, HouseApproves TougherRuleson Wall

Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

12,

2oo9, at Ai.

S. 3217,11 ith Cong. § 951
amendment).
23

(2010)

(this bill was eventually added to H.R.

4173 as an

24 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. I11-203,
124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2oo).
25 The Say on Pay vote would cover the entire compensation-related disclosure in the
proxy statement, including the firm's Compensation Discussion and Analysis. See id.; see also
17 C.F.R. § 229-402 (2010) for executive compensation disclosure rules generally.
26 17 C.F.R. § 229-4o2(a)(3) (2010). Item 402 (a)(3) also requires disclosure with respect
to up to two former officers if such officers were only excluded because they were no longer
serving in that capacity. Id. at § 229.402(a)(3)(iv).
27 There may be more highly paid non-officers who would not be covered by Say on Pay.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b- 7 (2010) (defining "executive officer").
28 Dodd-Frank, § 951 at 1899.
29 See Cai & Walkling, supra note 15 (manuscript at 6-7).
30 See Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery Cole & Tracey Woidtke, Do Boards Pay Attention
When InstitutionalInvestorActivists 'Just Vote No'?, go J. FIN. EcoN. 84, 91 (2oo8) (suggesting that
losing non-binding votes may entail reputational costs to board members); see, e.g., Joseph
A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategyfor Dealing with BarbariansInside the Gates, 45
STAN. L. REV. 857, 929-30 (1993) (detailing the reputational costs to managers of losing even
non-binding votes).

§ 951,
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to agree to objectionable pay practices."
The leverage gained by shareholders through Say on Pay could
theoretically come into play at two distinct points in time. Most obviously,
shareholders could cast or threaten to cast an adverse Say on Pay vote. This
exertion of shareholder power would necessarily take place around the time
of the vote, i.e., after the compensation package has been awarded and a
performance period has concluded. The consequence to a director from the
negative vote would be embarrassment, perhaps coupled with a shareholder
effort to remove the director via a concurrent or subsequent proxy fight
or "vote no" campaign against the director. Similarly, the consequence to
compensation-receiving executives would be reputational, although any
employment-related consequence would be indirect given the inability of
shareholders to hire and fire executives."
Second, the threat of potentially adverse votes at future shareholder
meetings might cause boards (and executives) to consult with shareholders
prior to the establishment of executive pay arrangements. This prearrangement influence could be direct in the sense of discrete shareholderboard negotiations over pay parameters, or it could be indirect if the board
feels compelled to comply with compensation guidelines adopted by
shareholder groups or proxy services firms." Interestingly, Say on Pay's
proponents accord this ex ante type of leverage equal importance relative
to actual shareholder voting (or specific voting-related threats)." This
raises the obvious question: Why rely on ex post discipline to force ex
ante negotiations? Why not simply establish a formal ex ante disciplinary
mechanism that encourages the same sort of negotiation? The question
becomes especially salient when, as discussed below, the ex post aspect
of Say on Pay reduces its ability to discipline pay decisions in certain
circumstances.
A. The Experience in the UK
The UK adopted its version of mandatory Say on Pay in 2002. That
year, the UK Companies Act was amended to require a non-binding
shareholder vote on the Directors' Remuneration Report, the UK analog to
31 See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors'
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 57
(201o).

32 Shareholders could of course impose discipline on the executives qua directors, to the
extent they were board members.
33 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 8, at 347-48 (suggesting that the indirect sort of ex ante
influence is more likely than the former given the costs of firm-specific negotiations).
34 See, e.g., Stephen Davis, Does "Say on Pay" Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation
Accountable 10-12 (Millstein Ctr. for Corp. Governance & Performance, Policy Briefing No. i,
2007), available at http://millstein.som.yale.edu/Policy%2oBriefing%2oNo%2oI%20'Say%20
on%2oPay'.pdf.
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the executive compensation disclosure required by Item 402 of Regulation
S-K. 5 The new rule affected all UK companies traded on UK exchanges,
except for companies traded on the Alternative Investment Market.3 6
As described above, Say on Pay in the UK promised both ex post
discipline in the form of actual adverse votes or vote-related threats and ex
ante discipline in the form of incentives for boards to consult with or avoid
angering shareholders earlier in the process." Regarding the former, there
have been eight adverse shareholder votes since Say on Pay's adoption
in the UK.3 ' During that period, one in nine firms has been presented
with a significant minority - 20% or more - of shareholders voting in the
negative in any one Say on Pay vote." Significant shareholder advisors have
recommended negative votes in 10% and 13.4% of votes, respectively."4
This indicates that UK companies on the whole have received surprisingly
negative responses to their pay practices under Say on Pay.'
As far as the predicted ex ante discipline via board consultation with
shareholders, Stephen Davis reported anecdotal evidence of a marked
increase in compensation-related communication between companies,
on the one hand, and institutional shareholders and proxy services firms,
on the other. 42 For instance, a proxy services firm reported that it had
received 20 compensation-related consultative calls per year from firms
prior to Say on Pay's enactment in the UK, increasing to between 130 and

35 See Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002, S.I.
(U.K.), availableat http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2oo2/2002l986.htm.

2002/1986,

art. 3,11 234B

36 See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 420(l) (Eng.); Companies Act, 2oo6, c. 46, § 385(2)
(Eng.).
37 See Davis, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38 Id. at io.
39 Id. (citing a Deloitte study to that effect).
40 Id. (referring to the practices of Glass Lewis and RiskMetrics' British subsidiary,
RREV); Gordon, supra note 8, at 343.
41 Interestingly, Gordon and Davis appear to take away different implications from these
figures. Gordon writes that negative votes have generally been minimally supported, but
"[njevertheless, in recent years, the proxy services firms have recommended negative votes in
ten to fifteen percent of cases .... " Gordon, supra note 8, at 343 (emphasis added). Davis, on
the other hand, writes:

Moreover, the proxy services themselves have largely exercised
restraintin their advice. Glass Lewis has recommended votes against at
approximately io% of UK companies covered. ISS, which operates in
Britain through RREV, a wholly owned subsidiary linked to the National
Association of Pension Funds, recommended votes against remuneration
reports in 13.4% of cases (i58 companies out of a universe of 1,183) in
2oo6.

Davis, supra note 34, at Io (emphasis added).
42 Davis, supra note 34, at io.

20IO-20I1I1
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150 calls afterward." That there was more communication between boards
and important shareholder interests indicates that Say on Pay afforded
shareholders more leverage than they had previously enjoyed. But given
the almost 1100 firms otherwise captured by the Say on Pay rule,44 it is not
clear that Say on Pay granted them very much leverage.4 1
After 2002, many shareholder groups in the UK scrambled to establish
compensation-monitoring systems commensurate with their new voting
power.4 1 Others simply outsourced the necessary monitoring to proxy
advisors or industry coalitions.47 Those investors who chose to become
more actively involved ran into several challenges. 4 As a result, some opted
to avoid the firm-specific analysis and instead adopt broadly applicable
compensation principles or "best practices".49
Along with directly observable shareholder adaptations like these, Say on
Pay had an effect on actual compensation patterns in the UK. Interestingly,
it had no impact on aggregate CEO compensation, which continued to grow
substantially.5 o However, in the most significant empirical study of the UK
experience, Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber did find increased sensitivity
of CEO pay to poor performance after Say on Pay's passage. 5 ' While there
had been no statistically significant relationship between negative returns
measures and CEO pay prior to Say on Pay, those measures became
correlated with CEO pay after its enactment.52 This change can be fairly
attributed to Say on Pay" and indicates that Say on Pay in the US may have
a similar effect.54
43 Id.
44 Gordon, supranote 8, at 350-51.

45 As expected, there is even less information concerning the frequency with which
boards are simply complying with shareholder-imposed guidelines rather than engaging in a
more substantive discussion with shareholder groups. Gordon suggests that this form of influence is likely to dominate the firm-specific sort, see Gordon, supra note 8, at 347, a view which
is intuitively persuasive though certainly not yet demonstrated.
46 Davis, supra note 34, at 12.

47 Id.
48 Id. (describing an "arms race" between shareholders' in-house compensation experts
and boards' compensation consultants).
49 Id.; see also Gordon, supra note 8, at 347 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 See Davis, supra note 34, at ii (describing studies by Manifest, New Bridge, PIRC,
and RREV showing annual increases between s% and i1%); see also Fabrizio Ferri & David
Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK 20 (June 15, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1420 3 9 4 .pdf (finding no change in the level and growth of CEO pay after controlling for
performance and other determinants).
51 See Ferri & Maber, supranote 50, at

19.

Id.
53 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 346 (dismissing the possibility that increased disclosure
rather than Say on Pay drove Ferri and Maber's findings).
54 But see Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor
52
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Ferri and Maber further found that the increased sensitivity of CEO
pay to poor firm performance is driven by increased sensitivity at firms they
characterized as having "controversial CEO pay practices." 5 They offered
as proxies for this group high (greater than 20%) Say on Pay dissent in 200356
and high levels of "'excess' CEO pay," defined as CEO compensation above
that predicted by commonly-used economic variables. 57 Ferri and Maber
found statistically significant differences between high dissent firms and
low dissent firms in post-Say on Pay changes regarding the sensitivity of
CEO pay to industry adjusted negative returns on assets." In fact, only high
dissent firms experienced a statistically significant change in pay sensitivity
to poor performance.5 9 Ferri and Maber found similar differences in postSay on Pay sensitivity changes among firms with high levels (top quartile)
of excess CEO compensation versus those with relatively low levels
(bottom three quartiles).6 0 These findings indicate that Say on Pay's effect
was limited to pay at poorly performing firms with poor prior pay practices,
a degree of precision pointing in favor of increased shareholder power.
Finally, Ferri and Maber found no post-Say on Pay differences in the
sensitivity of CEO pay to positive return measures.6 1 That is, CEOs at
above-median performing companies were paid exactly as they had been
before Say on Pay was enacted. This finding was consistent even with
respect to those high-performing firms that otherwise had "controversial"
pay practices represented by high voting dissent or high levels of excess
CEO compensation. 62 In short, Say on Pay had no disciplining effect on a
firm's pay practices as long as that firm performed well. 6 1

Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MicH. L. REV. 1997, 2078-85 (1994) (suggesting that
institutional investors may not have as great of an impact in the US as they do in the UK).
55 Ferri & Maber, supra note 50, at 21.
56 2003 was the first year in which say on pay votes became mandatory Id. at I.
57 Id. at 21. In defining excess, Ferri and Maber refer to the economic determinants
used by John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, CorporateGovernance, Chief
Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance,51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 379-82 (1999): firm
sales, year-end market-to-book ratio averaged over the previous five years, industry variables,
accounting return on assets (computed as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to
total assets) and the annual stock market return on common stock and total variance measures
(to proxy firm risk).
58 Ferri & Maber, supra note 50, at 22-23.
59 Id. It is one of Part III's implications that high Say on Pay dissent may not demonstrate
that a firm had "poor" pay practices. See infra Part III. In that case, Ferri and Maber's findings
would show only that firms with bad Say on Pay experiences (for whatever reason) are more
likely to increase the sensitivity of pay and poor performance.
60 Ferri & Maber, supra note 5o, at 22-23.
61 Id. at 52 tbl. 5.
62 Id. at 53-54 tbls.6 & 7.
63 There was no increased sensitivity across all high-performing firms, either. Id. at 52
tbl.5.
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B. GeneralCriticismsof Say on Pay
Like other attempts to increase shareholder power," Say on Pay has
been criticized on the grounds that the reallocation of authority will result
in a net loss for firms. Some have suggested that certain shareholder groups
might be able to use their newfound leverage to extract personal benefits
from boards. 6 1 Yet it is hard to see how Say on Pay would produce any real
increase in shareholder extortion opportunities even if certain shareholders
were so inclined. Those shareholders with ulterior motives have a number
of other options at their disposal including "withhold the vote" campaigns
and the increasingly likely ability to use companies' proxies for nominating
insurgent director slates.66 These alternatives may carry with them collateral
consequences that make the extortion threat not particularly credible,' but
as discussed in Part III, collateral consequences make extortion based on
Say on Pay even less credible. 68
Other arguments against shareholder empowerment commonly
conclude that shareholders are apt to make honest but poor decisions with
regard to compensation matters. Along this line, some critics proceed from
a more general philosophical position that the board authority is valuable
and worthy of protection, a construction that is readily transferrable to the
particular authority/accountability issues in executive compensation.6 9
64 See Bebchuk, Shareholder Power, supra note 4, at 883 (citations omitted); Lipton &
Savirt, supra note 4, at 745-46.
65 Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 47 (suggesting that union and public pension funds may
use increased leverage granted by Say on Pay to extract private rewards including labor concessions and increased reputational benefits for fund managers); see also Ashwini K. Agrawal,
Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting I8 (N.Y.
Unix., Stern Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. Fin-o8-oo6, 2oo8), available at http://w4.stern.
nyu.edti/finance/docs/WP/2oo8/pdf/wpso8oo6.pdf (demonstrating that union shareholders
are less likely to support director nominees at corporations at which the union's members are
employed); Anabtawi, supra note 4, at 575-77 (discussing private benefits that certain shareholders may seek to extract if given new power).
66 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29024, 29027 (June
18, 2oo9) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. 200). Moreover, Ferri and Maber's findings indicate that
only firms with problematic pay practices became targets, limiting the argument that share6
holders were behaving opportunistically. See supra notes 59- 0 and accompanying text.
67 Additionally, the majority vote requirement for shareholder action may check rentseeking shareholders' ability to extort. See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas,
i 8,
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 M icH. L. REV. IO
lo82-84 (1998). ButseeAnabtawi, supra note 4, at 594-97 (arguing the majority vote rule may
not successfully deter shareholders from seeking private benefits).
68 Butsee Gordon,supra note 8, at 337 (suggesting that the director election route is likely
to be a less credible tool for accountability than Say on Pay because of other issues bundled
in any director vote).
69 See Bainbridge,supra note 7, at 47 ("Whatever flaws board governance may have, they
pale in comparison to the information asymmetries and collective action problems that lead
most shareholders to be rationally apathetic."); Stout, supra note 4, at 792-97. Bainbridge, at
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Increased shareholder influence over executive compensation would, on
this account, diminish the gains produced by allowing a cohesive, informed,
and centralized board to respond quickly to market events and negotiate
the best deals possible with executives. Instead, empowered shareholders,
facing intractable informational disadvantages may consider the wrong
factors in making compensation-related decisions.7 0
The most exhaustive critique of Say on Pay of this sort was recently
developed by Jeffrey Gordon. Gordon points outthe tendency of institutional
shareholders to rely on proxy service firms for guidance in deciding how to
vote on Say on Pay." On the one hand, the use of proxy advisors alleviates
concerns about dispersed shareholders' inability to become informed and
coordinate their voting.n But Gordon argues that this reliance on proxy
services firms also has two distinct, and potentially harmful, effects.
First, the proxy firms may have conflicts of interest. 3 They have client
companies that pay for advice on how to improve "corporate governance
scores" compiled by the firms at the same time they are providing advice
to investors regarding those companies.7 4 Gordon concludes:
In a mandatory 'say on pay' world ... it is easy to imagine that a single entity

could create guidelines, establish rating systems for good compensation,
consult with firms on how to improve their compensation ratings in light
of their particular circumstances, and then, behind purported ethical and
physical barriers, provide proxy voting advice to shareholders."
Second, and more importantly, efficiencies as well as efforts to remove
least, also argues against Say on Pay on grounds of federalism. Bainbridge, supra note 7, at
44-46.
70 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 695 (2oo) ("[The Say on Pay] vote likely will reflect
levels of satisfaction with recent price performance rather than considered views about optimal incentive pay or the full set of performance data, much of which will remain unobservable."). Bratton and Wachter also raise questions about shareholder power over compensation
decisions in the face of a bubble. See id. at 715. As the speculative component of a firm's stock
price increases in size relative to the fundamental value component, shareholders may look
to incentivize short-sighted behavior to take advantage of the bubble and quickly flip their
shares before the bubble bursts. See id.
71 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 351-52. This phenomenon has apparently been experienced in the UK. See Davis, supra note 34, at 12.
72 See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of
Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 649, 655 (2009) (noting that institutional investors purchase
proxy advisory services because "they may lack the specialized staff or expertise to research
voting issues directly").
73 See Gordon,supra note 8, at 352-53.
74 See Robert Daines, Ian Gow & David Larcker, Rating the Ratings: How Good are
Commercial Governance Ratings 1-5 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford
Univ. Working Paper Series No. I, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id= 1 152093.

75 Id at 353 (citation omitted); see also Choi et al., supra note 72, at 657-58.
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the taint of those potential conflicts are likely to move proxy service
firms toward adopting one-size-fits-all rules." Under Say on Pay, subject
companies would be free to offer the proxy service firms any companyspecific justifications for departing from established compensation
guidelines. But given the costs of company-specific negotiation, proxy
service firms may be difficult to persuade in non-extreme circumstances."
The result is amplified once companies assume non-negotiability, leading
them to never reach out to the proxy service firms in the first place.
As a result, Say on Pay may tend to homogenize compensation practices
across public firms.This tendency to conform to proxy firm guidelines could
be value-decreasing for firms facing idiosyncratic compensation issues or
if the executive compensation market is operating inefficiently. Consider
stock option repricing under equity-compensation plans." If a company's
share price falls far enough below the exercise price of executives' options,
the options either begin to lose their ability to incentivize behavior,
or, alternatively, encourage the executives to undertake exceptionally
risky projects, the only ones with a chance of driving the options into
the money." Thus, in cases where executive motivation is particularly in
question, options are deeply underwater and the equity plan has few shares
remaining for distribution, repricing the existing options to a lower exercise
price may be the sensible thing to do. On the other hand, the potential for
repricing options clearly diminishes the initial pay-for-performance aspect
of the option."o Thus, shareholders should be expected to generally object
to option repricing while nevertheless reserving judgment in the particular
case described above. Yet, experience with equity-compensation plans
indicates that shareholders avoid permitting the latter sort of discretion.
Since 2003, shareholders have been required to approve any compensation
plan at companies listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq that would pay in equity,
including stock options." In general, the plans approved by shareholders

76 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 347 (observing the efficiencies gained by establishing
general guidelines); id. at 353 (noting RiskMetrics' adoption of a non-negotiation policy to
avoid the potential for conflict). Again, this phenomenon has apparently been experienced
in the UK. See Davis, supra note 34, at 13. Moreover, the phenomenon is not limited to proxy
firms' clients. Even those institutional shareholders who keep Say on Pay analysis in-house

will feel the economic pressure to adopt one-size-fits-all rules regarding voting on their portfolio companies.

77 See Gordon, supra note 8, at 352.
78 See id.at 330; see alsoAndrew C.W. Lund, What Was the Question?The NYSE and Nasdaqs
Curious ListingStandardsRequiringShareholderApproval of Equity-Compensation Plans,39 CONN.
L. REV. I l9, 136 (2oo6) (noting the paucity of repricing provisions in shareholder-approved
equity compensation plans).
79 BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 5, at 166.

8o Id. at 165-66.
81 Lund, supra note 78, at 126-27 (citations omitted) (describing the rules and noting

that they exempted plans that only granted equity as inducements to potential employees
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have set out basic ground rules, leaving the granular detail of the actual
equity grants to firm discretion. 2 However, shareholders have insisted, as
one of these ground rules applicable across firms, that option repricing be
prohibited."
Of course, whether homogenization is really harmful depends on the
level of compensation-related idiosyncrasy across firms. This may very well
be underwhelming." Moreover, economy-wide, the disciplining effect of
shareholder-imposed rules on otherwise non-idiosyncratic companies may
outweigh the costs imposed on outlier firms. Ultimately, the issue turns
on empirical questions regarding the amount of heterogeneity one would
expect with respect to the decision class and the value of a potentially
constraining influence on the homogenous group."'
Finally, another criticism has recently surfaced in relation to the
concerns about risk-taking, particularly in the financial sector. Many
scholars and policymakers have laid responsibility for the recent financial
crisis at the doorstep of bankers' pay structures.16 While some have
in a post-acquisition conversion situation or to employees of an acquired company under the
acquired company's old plans, as well as tax-qualified or parallel excess plans).
82 See BERCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 5, at 196; see also Gordon,
supra note 8, at 337 (describing shareholder say over equity compensation plans as "general"
rather than "specific").

83 See, e.g., RISKMETRIcs GRP., 2oo8 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 29
(2007), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/2oo8PolicyUSSummaryGu
idelines.pdf.
84 One reason to expect a high-level of idiosyncrasy is variation in executive wealth. See
John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives:
A Survey, EcoN. Pol'Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 39-40, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/epr/o3vo9nd/o3o4core.html. Yet the evidence indicates that firms very rarely adjust
compensation decisions based on executives' portfolio holdings. Id.
85 Gordon attempts to solve the problem he diagnoses, in part, by requiring an opt-in
vote by shareholders to establish a Say on Pay requirement at any particular firm. See Gordon,
supra note 8, at 356. But the opt-in device seems to simply push the difficult issue to an
earlier stage. That is, the vote to opt-in or out would seem to fall prey to exactly the kind of
homogenizing effect that Gordon attributes to the Say on Pay vote. Gordon observes that the
opt-in mechanism would allow shareholders to target only those firms "whose pay practices
(or their boards' justifications for them) raise the most serious questions." Id. It is hard to see
why the same investors would not make the same distinction when determining how to cast
their Say on Pay vote. Investors who would otherwise rely on their own guidelines or those of
proxy firms with respect to Say on Pay would have to establish (or receive) similar guidelines
with respect to opting in to the Say on Pay regime.
86 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, PayingforLong-Term Performance, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1915, 1922 (2010) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, Payingfor Long-Term Performance];
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 274-77
(2oo); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and
Committing to the Long-Term 3-6 (Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ.,
and Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 374, 2009), availableathttp://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id= 1336978; Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: StructuringExecutive
Compensation for Risk Regulation 13-20 (Emory Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-93, 2010),
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focused their criticism on short-term incentives,"' others have pointed to
the divergence of risk preferences between executives (as equityholders
through option and restricted stock awards) and debtholders." At least for
the latter camp, it is key to make executives think less like shareholders, or
worse, optionholders." But shareholders will obviously prefer managerial
incentives to be more closely aligned with their own. Thus, empowering
shareholders to influence pay may lead to a greater reliance on equity-based
pay structures, thereby increasing incentives to take excessive amounts of
risk.90
Suffice it to say that the criticisms of mandatory Say on Pay are strong
and sophisticated. Notably, some of the fiercest critics of executive
compensation practices seem reluctant to embrace the rule. For better or
worse, however, increased shareholder power over compensation will be a
fact for the foreseeable future.

II.

HAVING A SAY ON

PAY AFTER

THE

FACT

The foregoing criticisms of Say on Pay derive from a view of the merits
of increasing shareholder power over compensation decisions. They say
little, though, about the merits of Say on Pay as an alternative among
different mechanisms for effecting that increase. In particular, none of the
critiques addresses the disadvantages of presenting shareholders with a
disciplinary device hinging on an ex post vote rather than an ex ante one.
If Say on Pay's disciplinary effect occurs at the time of the ex post vote,
then having a shareholder vote after the compensation decision and the
performance period makes it vulnerable to bundling problems. Even if Say
on Pay's discipline is found in the ex ante negotiations entered into because
of potential expost discipline, bundling problems remain because the base

available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 1546229.
87 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, PayingforLong-Term Performance,supra note 86, at 1923-25.
Bhagat and Romano's preference for long-term incentives as opposed to short-term ones is
less obviously a reaction to the financial crisis, but rather a response to manipulative behavior
of the kind seen in the Enron scandal. See Bhagat & Romano,supra note 86, at 6-7.
88 See Tung, supra note 86, at 24-25 (suggesting that bank executives be compensated
in bank sub debt securities to avoid the mismatched incentives created by equity compensation); Bebchuk & Spamann, supranote 86, at 283 (suggesting that bank executives be awarded
a "broader basket of securities representing a larger part of the corporate pie").
89 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 86, at 27 i-72 (noting the ability of option awards
to distort risk-taking incentives even more than share awards).
90 Id. at 275-76 ("In the case of banks, making directors more attentive to common shareholder views, and thereby making pay arrangements somewhat more aligned with common
shareholder interests, cannot be relied on to eliminate incentives to take excessive risks.")
(citation omitted); seealso Ing-law Cheng, Harrison Hong & Jose A. Scheinkman, Yesterday's
Heroes: Compensation andCreative Risk-Taking 33-34 (ECGI-Fin. Working Paper No. 285/2lo0,
2oio), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract id=1502762.
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threat of a future adverse vote is not credible for the same bundling-related
reasons.
The most salient implication of these bundling problems is that Say on
Pay will fail to discipline high-performing firms where bundling problems
are greatest. In fact, the evidence that we have on Say on Pay's effects in the
UK confirms that high-performing firms are likely to be under-disciplined
by a US version. Pay-performance sensitivity only increased for firms with
negative earnings results, indicating that shareholders were unable to
discipline high-performing firms even when those firms had questionable
pay practices.9 1 Thus, there seem to be two independent and necessary
conditions for Say on Pay's discipline-poor pay practices 92 and poor firm
performance-when the former should be sufficient. 93
A. Pay-for-PerformanceandDiscipline of High-PerformingFirms
The remainder of this Part argues that the timing of the Say on Pay vote
helps explain the UK data and, indeed, that it would be surprising for Say
on Pay to have turned out any other way. However, there is an alternative
explanation for the UK phenomenon to address first. It may be that Say on
Pay's singular effect on poorly-performing firms derives from shareholders'
discipline preferences: they may simply care much more about pay-forfailure than they do about overpayment-for-success. 94 On this view, Say
on Pay in the UK did not increase pay-performance sensitivity at high
performing firms because shareholders cared less about linking the two
(or any other governance issue, for that matter) once a threshold level of
performance was certain. If this is true, the failure to discipline highperforming firms simply reflects a general fact about shareholder activism,
a fact that stands regardless of the structure of Say on Pay.
The explanation from bifurcated pay preferences is hard to square with
theory or evidence, however. Today, almost all participants in the debate
over executive compensation are committed to pay-for-performance.9 s
91 See Ferri & Maber, supra note 50, at 23-25, 53-54 tbls.6 &7.
92 This first condition is slightly problematic in that it lumps together as objectionable
practices both excess CEO compensation and past negative Say on Pay votes. One potential
problem with the latter, for present purposes, is that it begs the question of what caused
shareholders to cast adverse votes in the past - something about the packages themselves or
general firm performance? Nevertheless, Ferri and Maber did find that even high-performing
firms with excess CEO compensation did not experience discipline as a result of Say on Pay.
Ferri & Maber, supra note 5o, at 53-54 tbls.6 & 7; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.

93 See infra PartI I.A.
94 Gordon, supra note 8, at 345 ("(The distinction] is consistent with avoiding pay for
failure, certainly a major theme, if not the preoccupation, of the reform impulse behind the
(Director Remuneration Report requirement including Say on Pay].").
95 The minority, on the other hand, ranges from those who doubt the ability of executives to greatly influence firm performance, see, e.g., KHURANA, supra note Io, at 22, to those who
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Pay-for-performance implies a level of pay contingency across all
performance outcomes, not merely the rejection of pay-for-failure. In its
most simplified form, making compensation contingent on performance
may incentivize executives to increase shareholder value when they might
otherwise be expected to shirk. 96 Indeed, the argument implies a rejection
of the view that there is an aggregate amount of compensation that is per se
objectionable." For instance, Kevin Murphy and Michael Jensen famoisly
titled a paper, in part, "It's Not How Much You Pay, But How." They
concluded that increased sensitivity of pay to performance would likely lead
to increased total compensation for CEOs, but that such an increase would
be more than offset by the gains to shareholders produced by the more
productive managers.99 As long as executive pay is encouraging behavior
that increases firm value and executives are not extracting rents greater
than those gains, shareholders should be neutral to bullish regarding total
compensation, even at otherwise extraordinarily high levels.
But even if increased pay encourages executives to make more wvealthmaximizing decisions,o00 that does not mean that all wealth-maximizing
decisions are the result of increased pay or any particular pay structure.
A firm's success does not ensure that pay was structured optimally. It is
possible that different pay practices could have improved firm performance
or less pay could have resulted in similar performance. Shareholders should
believe that a pay-for-performance framework harms non-pecuniary executive incentives,
NICCONVILL, THE FALSE PROMISE OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE: EMBRACING A POSITIVE
MODEL OF THE COMPANY EXECUTIVE 49 (2005).

see JAMES

96 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives- Its Not How Aluc/ You
Pay, But How, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138, 138-41.
97 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCF, supra note 5, at 8 (admitting that
their aim was to link pay and performance rather than limiting pay more generally).
98 Jensen & Murphy, supra note 96, at 138.
99 Id. at 139 ("These increases in compensation-driven by improved business performance-would not represent a transfer of wealth from shareholders to executives. Rather, they
would reward managers for the increased success fostered by greater risk taking, effort, and
ability. Paying CEOs 'better' would eventually mean paying the average CEO more. Because
the stakes are so high, the potential increase in corporate performance and the potential gains
to shareholders are great.").
1oo This position rests on at least two controversial propositions. First, firm performance
must always have room to improve by way of better management. However, it is notoriously
difficult to separate CEO performance from other factors leading to firm performance. See,
e.g., KHURANA, supra note 1o, at 2 1-23 (describing the debate between the "leadership" and
"constraint" schools of thought regarding CEO effects on firm performance). Second, CEOs
must be thought to only supply that marginal-wealth-generating management when they
are further compensated for doing so. This would require ever-increasing marginal levels
of managerial productivity, i.e., that CEOs always hold back some effort or skill. But there is
necessarily a saturation point with respect to incentives beyond which CEOs either cannot be
more productive or have become immune to further remunerative incentives. Moreover, as
Jensen and Murphy note, the threat of potential dismissal provides a base level of incentives.
See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 96, at 142.
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only want additional amounts paid when doing so produces greater benefits
than the compensation costs."o'
Payments in excess of this point may, of course, be less harmful to
shareholder value than payments that provide too few incentives, given
the differences of magnitude between compensation and firm value. When
pay exceeds the optimal amount, the total cost to shareholders equals the
excess compensation cost that is not offset by any marginal increase in firm
value. When pay does not provide enough incentives, the cost may be a
decrease in firm value that cannot be offset by the reduced compensation
cost. Faced with the uncertain location of the optimal balance, shareholders
committed to a strong pay-for-performance preference might be expected
to err on the side of providing too many incentives. But it nevertheless
seems bizarre that rational shareholders would consistently leave money on
the table in a Say on Pay world when realized pay is apparently excessive.10 2
Along this line, significant institutional investors explicitly highlight the
need to constrain pay even in cases of exceptional firm performance."o3
There must be something else at play in the UK experience with Say
on Pay. Shareholders' commitment to pay-for-performance might flow
from a sort of inchoate intra-firm populism, with shareholders essentially
making a claim that no executive should do too well unless the rest of the
firm is doing well enough." Alternatively, pay-for-performance may serve
as a hedging strategy for investors seeking to cut compensation expenses
in bad times.10 Finally, shareholders could simply be committing error by
failing to discipline high-performing firms in spite of their stated pay-forperformance commitments, perhaps out of excessive hindsight bias.10 6 In
ioi See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebehuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, ManagerialPower
and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Ci. L. REV. 751, 763-64
(2002) ("Under the optimal contracting approach, shareholders should continue to give value
to executives until the incremental cost of doing so outweighs the incremental benefit of the
incentives produced.").
102 See id. at 764 ("A compensation plan designer ... would consider alternative structures both in terms of their incentive benefits and their costs to the company. No scheme
would be chosen, of course, if an alternative scheme could produce the same or better incentives at a lower cost to the company.").
103 See CouNcIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES §§
5.1, 5.5d, http://www.cii.org (follow "Council Policies" hyperlink; then follow "Full Council
Corporate Governance Policies" hyperlink) (last updated Apr. 13, 2010) ("While the Council
believes that executives should be well paid for superior performance, it also believes that executives should not be excessively paid.... Performance measures applicable to all performancebased awards . . . should reward superior performance ...

at minimum reasonable cost. Such

measures should also reflect downside risk.") (emphasis added).
104 See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposalfor(Further)Reform, So SMU L. REV. 201, 223 (1996).
105 This position is weakened by the relatively small magnitude of executive compensation relative to most firms' balance sheets.
io6 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 Tex.
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any of these cases, the failure to constrain pay at high-performing firms
would again reflect a characteristic of compensation activism generally
rather than a structural flaw in Say on Pay.107
Without completely dismissing those possibilities, there is little evidence
that institutional shareholders or proxy services firms feel that pay-forperformance is conceptually limited to the avoidance of pay-for-failure.'"
Of course, the absence of such a statement in proxy firms' public statements
does not definitively show that their view of pay-for-performance applies
equally to high-performing firms as it does to poorly-performing firms.
Nevertheless, it is perhaps telling in the light of the different explanations
for the under-disciplining of high-performing firms developed hereinafter.
B. The Problems with Say on Pay's Timing
The more plausible explanation for shareholders' failure to discipline
pay at high-performing firms is that implementing such discipline carries
greater perceived costs than discipline at low-performing firms. These
costs can be divided into process-related costs including monitoring and
vote coordination efforts, and anticipated but unintended secondary costs
related to the discipline. The remainder of this Part makes two related
points. First, process-related costs in a world of scarce monitoring resources
do not explain much about the experience with Say on Pay. Second, Say
on Pay's unintended collateral costs are likely to appear significant to
shareholders. Together, these points indicate that Say on Pay's bundling
issues are a significant cause of the inability to fully discipline excessive
pay.
1. Firm Performanceandthe Limited Resources of Monitors.-The connection
between firm performance and shareholder activism has been well
documented.' 9 Traditionally, this link has been explained by reference to
the incentives (or lack thereof) of shareholders to actively monitor firms."o
L. Rev. 1615, 1657-58 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN BEBCHUK

& JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT

PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004)).
107 Though, in the case of error by virtue of hindsight bias, pushing the shareholder vote
up in time would make it less likely for pay practices to be conflated with performance during
the relevant performance period.
io8 See infra Part I.B.I.
1o9 For one review of that research pre-1999, see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J.
Martin, The Effect of ShareholderProposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021,
1056-59 (1999);seealso Jonathan M. Karpoff, Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Corporate
Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. EcoN. 365, 366 (1996);

Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, ShareholderProposalsin the New Millennium: Shareholder
Support, BoardResponse, andMarket Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 368 (2007).
I 1o See, e.g., Ferri & Maber, supra note 5o, at 19; Thomas & Martin, supra note lo9, at
1055 ("Most researchers hypothesize that investors can be expected to be active monitors of
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Activism may be costly, potentially unsuccessful, and even if successful,
only minimally accretive to all but the largest shareholders. Consequently,
institutional investors have been shown to be more likely to target
poor-performing firms when making shareholder proposals"' and, once
shareholder proposals are offered, high-performing firms have been shown
to be less likely to face high levels of voting in favor of them."' As just
one example from the world of compensation activism, Randall Thomas
and Kenneth Martin analyzed compensation-related shareholder proposals
from the 1993 through 1997 proxy seasons and found that whether activists
offered such proposals was inversely related to market-adjusted common
stock returns over three- and five-year intervals. 13
Those findings are not surprising given that institutional investors,
like everyone else, have limited resources to expend on firm monitoring.
Consequently, they should be expected to adopt monitoring strategies
that economize. As discussed above, they may respond to this reality by
establishing one-size-fits-all guidelines and/or farming out much of the
monitoring work to agents.14 To the extent they do make firm-specific
determinations, scarcity of resources may cause them (or their agents) to
limit the number of firms that they study or in which they ultimately make
activism investments.'
With respect to Say on Pay in the UK, however, proxy firms and
institutional shareholders and advisors have tended to downplay the
importance of firm performance to their analyses in their public statements.
In the UK, the Association of British Insurers ("ABI"), whose members
and subscribers represent approximately thirty percent of the UK equity
market, has established executive pay guidelines that apply regardless
of performance categories."' Its IVIS service prepares reports for all UK
firms with color-coded "tops" indicating significant, less significant, and
managers when the benefits of such monitoring exceed the costs.").
III Thomas & Martin, supra note og, at 1056-57 (citing research describing the behavior of CalPERS, the United Shareholders of America, the Council of Institutional Investors as
well as economy-wide shareholder activism).
112 Id. at 1058-59 (citation omitted) (citing Johnson and Shackell's work demonstrating
that firm performance was inversely correlated with shareholder support, while compensation
plan design was not correlated with such support at all).
113 Id. at 1o64.
114 See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
115 See, e.g., Black & Coffee, supra note 54, at 2053 (discussing phenomenon as it relates

to British institutional investors).
I16 Telephone interview with representative, Ass'n of British Insurers (Apr. 27, 2010);
see also Ass'N OF BRITISH INSURERS, INSTITUTIONAL VOTING INFO. SERV., EXECUTIVE
REMUNERATION-ABI GUIDELINES ON POLICIES AND PRACTICES 4 (2009), available at http://
www.ivis.co.uk/PDF/ABIRemunerationGuidelinesDec-2009.pdf ("Executive remuneration should be set at levels that retain and motivate, based on selection and interpretation of
appropriate benchmarks which should be used with caution, in view of the risk of an upward
ratchet of remuneration levels with no corresponding improvement in performance.").
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no significant governance-related concerns."' These reports go into a fair
amount of compensation detail and explicitly consider excessiveness of pay
even at highly-performing firms."' Similarly, the RiskMetrics subsidiary
involved with UK governance issues analyzes high-performing companies
as well as poor-performing ones and has done so at least since Say on Pay
became mandatory.19 The National Association of Pension Funds explicitly
2
adopts the ABI guidelines in its own voting guidelines,'1 and goes on to
2
describe twenty practices that might trigger adverse Say on Pay votes.' '
Most of these practices have little to do with firm performance, although
at least one-a board's resetting of performance goals-is more likely to
occur at poor-performing firms. This practice of "moving the goalposts"
is presumably less costly to observe than it is to judge the appropriateness
of their initial placement,' and thus provides some limited evidence that
monitoring cost considerations might help explain the UK experience.
Interestingly, US proxy firm and institutional shareholder expressions of
Say on Pay analyses are roughly similar to their UK counterparts. In the US,
though, proxy firms are slightly more likely to explicitly link performance
RiskMetrics' US group, for
with recommendations more generally.'
example, describes how it focuses its Say on Pay activism on firms with
"sustained underperformance relative to peers," assuming that the pay/
24
performance link will be most attenuated in those companies. 1 A finding of
poor pay/performance sensitivity functions as one of the three stated primary
grounds for RiskMetrics making a negative Say on Pay recommendation,
and the other two primary grounds-"problematic pay practices" and "poor
I17 IVIS Report ColourCoding, INSTITUTIONAL VOTING INFO. SERV., http://www.ivis.co.uk/
UsinglVIS-ReportColourCoding.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 20 IO).
I18 For a sample report, see INSTITUTIONAL VOTING INFO. SERv., AGM FOR THE YEAR
ENDING 26/I i/2007 2 (2007), http://www.ivis.co.uk/PDF/IVISPlcI5so2007.pdf (for a firm
with an above-median o--year TSR measure "[o]verall levels of remuneration do not appear
to be excessive with an appropriate balance struck between fixed and variable pay [and] EPS
targets attached to the exercise of options appear to be suitably demanding.").
I19 Telephone interview with representative, RiskMetrics Group (Mar. 30, 200).
120 NAT'L Ass'N OF PENSION FUNDS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY AND VOTING
GUIDELINES

24 (Feb. 2009),

http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/DocumentLibrary.

aspx (follow the "C" hyperlink; then follow the "Corporate governance policy and voting
guidelines" dated Feb.6, 2oo9 hyperlink to download the PDF file) ("The NAPF anticipates

that most institutional investors and issuers will use the ABI Guidelines as a benchmark for
remuneration policies and has therefore chosen not to re-interpret them in detail here.").
121 Id. at 24-25.
122 Cf id. at 24 (describing IVIS's close examination of performance metrics).

123 See Recommendations on an Issue-by-Company Basis, PRoxy GOVERNANCE, INC., https://
www.proxygovernance.com/content/pgi/content/issue-by-issue.shtml (last visited Aug. 29,
2oio).
124 RISKMETRICs GRP., 20I0 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 39
http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG-20 Ioo US
at
available
(20io),
SummarvGuidelines2oIoo25.pdf [hereinafter RiSKMETRiCS GRP., 20io GUIDELINES].

140

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99

communication and responsiveness to shareholders"'s-do not obviously
capture instances of excess compensation on Ferri and Maber's terms."'6
As far as RiskMetrics's primary drivers of adverse Say on Pay votes, then,
none would necessarily impose discipline on excess compensation at highperforming firms: pay/performance sensitivity because high-performing
firms are screened out, and the other two factors because they do not
address excess compensation specifically.
On the other hand, Glass, Lewis & Company explicitly states on its
website that it applies a pay-for-performance test to all firms regardless of
performance;' that test is then used in its Say on Pay analysis.' 28 Moreover,
even RiskMetrics issues negative Say on Pay recommendations based on
excessive compensation at high-performing firms. In addition to the primary
factors it lists in its voting guidelines, RiskMetrics also notes additional
considerations including the propriety of performance metrics in incentive
plans, benchmarking practices, and the balance between performancebased versus non-performance-based pay.129 The first two of these may
catch much of excess compensation (as defined by Ferri and Maber) and do
so without a performance filter. This alternative route to negative Say on Pay
votes is more than illusory. In 2010, for instance, RiskMetrics recommended
a negative Say on Pay vote (and an "Against" vote against the entire
board) despite the fact that the firm had above-median performance over
a three- and five-year term."o The recommendations were not based on
pay/performance sensitivity (presumably because the firm was not caught
by the performance filter described above) and were instead generated by
Id. at 38.
See supra note 59.
127 See Proxy Paper Research and Custom Recommendations, GLASS, LEWIS & Co., http://
wwwN.glasslewis.com/downloads/overviews/proxypaper.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2010) ("Glass
Lewis uses a proprietary pay-for-performance model that evaluates compensation of the top
five executives at all US companies, benchmarking the compensation of these executives
125

126

against their performance.").
128 See GLASS, LEWIS &Co., US PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS
8 (2oo9), availableat http://www.
glasslewis.com/downloads/policies/USPolicyGuidelinesSummary2009.pdf.
LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE FOR U.S. COMPANIES

We closely review companies' compensation practices and
disclosures as outlined in their CD&As and other company filings to
evaluate [Say on Pay votes]. In evaluating these [votes], we examine
how well the company has disclosed information pertinent to its
compensation programs, the extent to which overall compensation is
tied to performance, the performance metrics selected by the company
and the levels of compensation in comparison to company performance
and that of its peers.

Id.
129

RISKMETRIcs GRP., 20Io GUIDELINES,supra

note 124, at39.

130 RiskMetrics Company Profile (on file with author).
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"pay magnitude, pay disparity, peer group disparity, and performance target
issues.""' Thus, while proxy firms do have incentives to reduce costs by
limiting their inquiry to poorly-performing firms, it appears that they do
not, at least not to any significant degree.'
Although it is difficult to say anything with certainty, recent research
outside of the compensation context also indicates that proxy firms do
not focus their monitoring energies specifically on poorly-performing
companies. Evaluating proxy firm recommendations for director elections,"'
Steve Choi, Jill Fisch, and Marcel Kahan studied the recommendations
of the four leading US proxy firms with respect to director elections in
2005 and 2006."' Their univariate analysis indicated that only Institutional
Shareholder Services (now RiskMetrics) and Glass, Lewis & Company
were less likely to issue a withhold recommendation for directors at
high-performing firms, while PROXY Governance and Egan-Jones
seemed to disregard firm performance entirely when making their
recommendations.' Their multivariate regressions, moreover, showed
that high firm performance was not significantly inversely correlated with any
proxy firm ' withhold recommendations other than at PROXY Governance
6
where the correlation was only marginally significant.3 Finally, limiting
the performance/recommendation inquiry to elections of CEOs and other
inside directors who may be more likely to be blamed or credited for firm
performance, Choi et al. found that top and/or bottom returns did not seem
to affect the proxy firms' "withhold" recommendations, contrary to their
expectations."' In short, US proxy firms at least do not generally shy away
from recommending discipline even at high performing firms despite their
limited resources. Although it is possible that shareholder advisors in the
131

Id.
132 Moreover, if Jeffrey Gordon is right and proxy firm vote recommendations are less
firm-specific than claimed, the cost of inquiry is even lower and scarcity of monitoring resources explains even less of the different treatment of high-performing and poorly-performing firms. See supm notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
133 Given the relatively scarce adoption of voluntary Say on Pay measures, there is not
enough data regarding proxy firm recommendations or US Say on Pay votes.
134 Choi et al., supra note 72, at 651.
135 Id. at 669-70. Choi et al. classify firms as high or low-performing if they fall in "the
top or bottom [five] percent of companies ranked based on abnormal holding period returns
[over the prior three years], adjusted based on the CSRP value-weighted market index." Id.
at 662. Consequently, their findings may not conclusively demonstrate that a rougher "5o%
are high-performing, 5o% are low-performing" approach has not been used by proxy firms.
See supra notes 11 1-13 and accompanying text.
136 Choi et al., supra note 72, at 671-75. Poor performance was significantly correlated
with Glass Lewis' withhold recommendations, though not with any other firm's. Id at 67475137 Id. at 68o-8i. It should be noted, however, that PROXY Governance, the only firm
to have a significant inverse relationship between high firm performance and withhold recommendations more generally, was omitted from these analyses. Id.
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UK are different in this respect, it is more plausible that something else is
causing the UK phenomenon.
Along this line, even if proxy firm recommendations regarding Say on
Pay votes are not biased in favor of high-performing firms, shareholder
voting might be. Proxy recommendations are one step removed from
the actual shareholder vote. The ultimate decision as to whether or not
to discipline firms by taking activist measures will usually be made by
proxy firms' clients, the institutional shareholders.' 3 Accordingly, there
may be leakage between proxy firms' recommendations and shareholder
votes. To this point, researchers have analyzed when and to what extent
mutual funds deviate from proxy firm recommendations. 139 James
Cotter, Alan Palmiter, and Randall Thomas found that ISS/RiskMetrics
recommendations have a more significant correlation with mutual funds'
voting decisions on management and shareholder proposals than do
management recommendations. 4 0 This is in line with the view that the
leakage between recommendations and shareholder voting should be
relatively small. After all, if shareholders' monitoring resources are scarce,
it would be surprising to find them checking the work of their advisors.
Interestingly, however, Cotter et al. still found significant mutual fund
deviation from ISS/RiskMetrics recommendations on both shareholder
proposals and management non-routine proposals. 4 ' The deviation rates
are even larger for shareholders as a whole.' 42 Whatever might cause this
leakage, however, it is unlikely to be shareholder monitoring costs. Solely
with respect to such costs, shareholders' most efficient strategy would be
to mechanically follow their advisors recommendations, recognizing that
the fees paid to those advisors are sunk while any independent monitoring
activities would require additional resources.
If one looks to governance and voting policies promulgated by significant
institutional shareholders themselves, one finds little evidence of a bias
towards highly-performing firms. CalPERS, for one, does not apply any sort
of performance test to filter out firms that do not need to be monitored.'
138 But see id. at 652 (some shareholders permit the proxy services firms to vote their
shares). In conversations with representatives from both RiskMetrics' UK arm and the ABI,
the advisors strongly asserted the independence of their members/clients regarding actual
voting behavior. Telephone interview with representative, Ass'n of British Insurers (Apr. 27,
2010); Telephone interview with representative, RiskMetrics Group (Mar. 30, 2010).
139 James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, ISS Recommendations and
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals,55 VILL. L. REV. I, 1 (2010).
140 Id. at 31, 32 tbl.2.

141 Id. at 48-50. Cotter et al. found that mutual funds deviated from the recommendation in 23% of instances involving shareholder proposals and 12.1% of instances involving
non-routine management proposals. Idat 51 tbl.6, Panel B.
142 Id. at 88-89. Deviations in 34.8% of instances involving shareholder proposals and
24.7% of instances involving non-routine management proposals. Id at 49 tbl.6, Panel A.
143 See CAL. PuB.
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TIAA-CREF's overarching policy statement on the matter discusses the
need to consider issues beyond firm performance." While these policies
may overstate the breadth of institutional investors' compensation-related
monitoring, it provides some indication that they would perform a Say on
Pay analysis on most firms.
Finally, taking delegating shareholders and non-delegating shareholders
together, evidence shows that investors have not generally avoided
disciplining high-performing firms in other compensation-related contexts.
With respect to compensation-related activism (including compensationrelated shareholder proposals and vote-no campaigns where there was
explicit mention in the soliciting materials of compensation issues),' 45
activist shareholders' voting decisions have not been particularly influenced
by firm performance. 141
In sum, proxy firms and institutional shareholders generally take critical
looks at even high-performing companies when making voting decisions,
including compensation-related decisions. This finding cabins, but does
not eliminate, the possibility that scarcity of resources can help explain the
7
reluctance of shareholders to discipline pay at high-performing firms.1
2. Bundling Say on Pay Discipline with the Perceived Costs of Offending
Managers.-Shareholders may incur other costs when they discipline
1 1-12 (20o), available at http://www.calpers-governanec.org/
GOVERNANCE
docs-sof/principles/2ol o-5-2-global-principles-of-accountable-corp-gov'.pdf.
CORPORATE

144 See TIAA-CREF, POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17-18, availp-tcp/documents/document/
tiaaOIOlO204.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).

able at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap-ucm

In addition to being performance based, executive compensation
should be reasonable by prevailing industry standards, appropriate to
the company's size and complexity, and fair relative to pay practices
throughout the company.

While equity-based compensation can offer great incentives to
management, it can also have great impact on shareholder value. ''he
need for directors to monitor and control the use of equity in executive
compensation, particularly stock options, has increased in recent years.

Id.
145 See Yonca Ertimur, Volkan 1Muslu & Fabrizio Ferri, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay
8-9 (CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2009), availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstract- 1443455.

146 Id. at 58, tbl.4. Their targeting decisions, on the other hand, were significantly related
to firm performance, among other things. Id. at 14.
147 But see Ferri & Maber, supra note 5o, at 3 ("[llnstitutional attention is a scarce resource that is allocated mostly to problem firms.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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managers, however. In particular, discipline may bring with it unintended
consequences insofar as it affects the behavior of the disciplined. Firm
performance becomes an important data point for discipline decisions if the
discipline may lead managers to shirk or depart from the firm in response.
If this is a non-trivial possibility, it may be best from the shareholder
perspective not to rock the boat on compensation. Thus, shareholders will
reintroduce (or perhaps shareholder advisors will include in the first place)
firm performance as a voting consideration where the appropriate answer
from an abstract compensation/governance perspective might have harmful
indirect performance consequences.
Take, for instance, the shareholder proposals singled out by Cotter et
al. in their study-declassifying the board, seeking shareholder approval of
poison pills, requiring majority vote for director elections, and separating
the CEO and chairman of the board positions.14 The first two are entirely
meta-governance issues and a vote for or against is unlikely to affect a firm's
operational performance beyond reducing managerial slack by making the
firm more open to the market for corporate control.' 4 ' The only reason to
consider firm performance in regard to such a vote is that low-performing
firms may benefit more from such a reduction than high-performing firms.
Shareholder votes to declassify boards, request shareholder input over antitakeover measures, or install a majority voting provision are commonplace,
generally applicable across firms, and therefore difficult for managers to take
personally. Accordingly, there are relatively few reasons for shareholders
at high-performing firms to fear negative performance effects due to an
activist vote.1s0
CEO/chair separation proposals are also structural and have become
generalizable across firms. But votes on such proposals are somewhat
susceptible of being viewed as a referendum on the CEO to the extent
the base concern driving the activism is the fear of a particular CEO not
being monitored. As such, the votes may theoretically have confounding
near-term performance implications if they were to offend the target CEO
and cause his or her defection from past behavior.'"' Interestingly, it is
on those proposals that Cotter et al. find high rates of deviation from ISS
recommendations. 52
148 Cotter et al., supra note 139, at 48-49, 49 tbl.6, Panel A.
149 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409, 411-414 (2005).

150 There may be reasons to refrain from taking the lead on such activism as the leader
may incur significant proxy costs. The advantages of free riding by other shareholders, however, should wind up mitigating that aspect of activism costs when follow-on shareholders
need only decide how to vote, guided by a proxy firm recommendation.
151 See supra Part I.B.I.
152 See Cotter et al., supra note 139, at48-50 (all shareholders) and 50-52 (mutual funds).
Cotter et al. also found high deviation rates from ISS recommendations involving majority
voting. Id. at 48-50. Of course, as CEO/chair split votes become more commonplace it be-
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Consider compensation-related activism more specifically. As
discussed above, shareholders' voting is surprisingly uncorrelated with
firm performance.- 3 Much of the activism in question-proposals calling
for greater compensation committee independence, greater compensation
disclosure, shareholder approval of certain compensatory items, linking
is a generalized
pay to social criteria, and the abolition of incentive pay'
sort that is not obviously bundled with confounding performance-related
consequences.'s Thus, there may be little reason for shareholders to take
anything other than the abstract and non-firm-specific governance (uestion
into account when voting. Furthermore, we should expect little leakage
from proxy firm recommendations or generally-accepted principles at that
level of abstraction.
Say on Pay is different because it is far more firm-and executive-

specific. Thus, even if Say on Pay's process-related costs are not greatthe vote is mandatory and advisors are already heavily relied upon--costs
created by the personalized nature of the subject matter may outweigh, or
maybe perceived by shareholders to outweigh, the benefits ofcompensation
discipline.
Bundling issues in shareholder voting are not new. Shareholder
veto power over certain transactions or governance adjustments may be
limited by the ability of interested directors to bundle a value-decreasing
proposal with a distinct proposal that is attractive to shareholders."' In
director elections, shareholders may have difficulty disciplining directors
over particular non-preferred board actions because they recognize the
potential costs-over the class of all other future board decisions-of losing
the directors.' The bundled costs here include the marginal decline in
performance realized by switching from current senior management to
the next best available candidates who would at least remedy the nonpreferred action."' If directors can anticipate shareholders' evaluation of
these bundled costs, they will have no cause to fear discipline up to the
comes harder for targets to take them personally so as to change their behavior.
153 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing the study by Ertimur,
IMuslu, and Ferri).
154 See Ertimur et al., supra note 145, at 9. Also included were performance-based vcsting conditions for equity grants, which would seem to have performance-related effects. Id.
155 For more on firm-specificity and its effect on institutional investors' willingness to
engage in activism, see Bebchuk, ShareholderPower; supra note 4, at 88 i (arguing that "rules of
the game" decisions are generally not firm-specific and shareholders are therefore reasonably
well-situated to exert influence over them).

156 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 IAiv L. REV.
1549, 1555-57 (20o); see, e.g., Bebchuk, ShareholderPower,supra note 4, at 864-65.

.

157 K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004
Wis. L. REV 1425, 1450-54 see, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Power. supra note 4, at 857-61.

158 See Camara, supra note 157, at 1450 (referring to the "loss of the incumbent seniormanagement team").
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admittedly nebulous point at which the costs of those actions equal the
costs of dismissal. 59
Although Say on Pay does not relate directly to director elections or
shareholder votes on management-sponsored proposals, it nevertheless
creates bundling issues. An adverse Say on Pay vote, like a vote-no campaign
against directors, is designed to send a message. Shareholder discipline in
these cases will not directly cause firm performance to change, but may
offend managers and cause them to change their managing behavior for the
worse. On this score, Say on Pay has a high potential for giving offense. The
Say on Pay vote is personal-there are at most five people's compensation
packages being judged, pay has significant ramifications to the executives,
and the entire process is played out in a very public setting. At its heart,
Say on Pay asks shareholders to decide whether executives deserved what
they were paid, a criticism that strikes directly at the executive's selfesteem. The potential for offense is only heightened if CEOs tend to be
more narcissistic as a class than others,' 60 or if they have a deep-seated
need for others' admiration and, concomitantly, a deep-seated aversion to
criticism.'' Losing a Say on Pay vote is humiliating to people who are not
used to being humiliated.'6 2
Therefore, prior to casting a negative Say on Pay vote, shareholders
may reasonably expect offended managers to slack or feel less loyalty
towards the firm after such a vote. Fiduciary duties and performancebased compensation provide relatively weak constraints on that sort of
deviation.'6 ' But even if there were sufficient mechanisms in place to
discipline offended managers who continue with the firm, managers may
instead leave the firm. Their ability to do so will depend on the vagaries of
the managerial labor market, but those managers at high-performing firms
will almost certainly have the greatest exit opportunities.6

159 Id.
160 See Jayne WN.Barnard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear,Anger, and Depression: The
InteriorLives of CorporateLeaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 410 (2oo8).
161 See ALAN DOWNS, BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS: OVERCOMING THE SEDUCTIVE CULTURE
OF CORPORATE NARCISSISM 17 (1997).
162 If Say on Pay votes were systematized according to one-size-fits-all structural rules,
then some of the personal nature of the vote could be dissipated. Because the data indicates
a bias against poor-performing firms, however, an adverse Say on Pay may not be seen by
managers in this way.
163 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of
Derivative Lawsuits, 57 \AND. L. REV. 1747, 1756-60 (2004). More controversially, the managerial labor market may discipline those who remain at the firm. See Cheng et al., supra note go,
at 6 (suggesting that executives may be incentivized to undertake risk based on the threat of
turnover).
164 See KHURANA, supra note to, at 104- o5; Bebehuk et al., supra note Ioo, at 776
("['The ability to get another CEO job will depend on the CEO's overall performance at her
current firm, not on the amount of rent extracted.").
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Of course, even if CEO deviation from past behavior, up to and including
departure, is a likely response to more personal forms of activism like Say
on Pay, that will only give shareholders pause if they believe that such
deviation could significantly affect firm performance. On this point, there
is little doubt that shareholders perceive an extraordinarily high correlation
CEO retention-the
between firm performance and CEO behavior.'
focus of shareholders confronted with possibly bundled Say on Pay
votes-is but the flip side of CEO recruitment. To the extent shareholders
perceive the link between CEO and firm performance at the hiring stage,
they surely do so at the retention stage. This is true even leaving aside
any bargaining advantages sitting CEOs may otherwise receive by virtue
of their incumbency. Incumbents may exert managerial power over pay
negotiations," but that does not change the calculus for shareholders
seeking to predict the marginal benefit to firm performance gained from
having CEO as opposed to CEO,.
If one looks at the CEO hiring process, it is relatively well-settled
that shareholders place a high value on that marginal difference. Since the
1980s, institutional shareholders have agitated for greater management
responsiveness believing, necessarily, that managers mattered.' 7 After
initial success, activist investors continued to press for corporate change
through the dismissal of CEOs who were viewed as ineffective."'" The
result was radically shorter CEO terms across the economy as a whole"'
and, consequently, significantly greater CEO attention being paid to large
investors.170 Rakesh Khurana summarized the state of affairs thusly: "All
of the forms of pressure applied by investors, via corporate directors, to
CEOs-but especially those aimed at achieving CEO dismissals-have
revealed a distinctly CEO-centered view of the corporation.""' Underlying
165 That is not to say that such a correlation actually exists. Indeed, many studies have
concluded that CEO-specific behavior has little effect on firm performance and that luck, for
instance, plays a larger role. Moreover, whatever effect a CEO might have had historically,
or might have prospectively, is likely unknowable to shareholders at the point at which they
would have their say on pay. See Michael B. Dorff, Confident Uncertainty, Excessive Conpensation
& the Obama Plan 24-25 (Sw. Law Sch., Working Paper No. o916, 2oo9), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract= 1364680. Nevertheless, it is the case that shareholders believe CEO-specific
behavior can significantly affect firm performance. KHURANA, supra note to, at 67.
166 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, Supra note 5, at 61-62.
167 See, e.g., KHURANA,Supra note 1o, at 55-57.

168 See id. at 59 (describing activist investors' role in CEO turnover at Coca-Cola and
Gillette).
169 See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover
Changed? 1-2,32 tbl. I (Aug. 2oo8) (unpublished manuscript), availableathttp://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/research/km.pdf).
170 See KHURANA, supra note to, at 59-60.
171 Id. at 60. This concentration on CEOs does not necessarily mean that investors did
not believe that factors beyond CEO characteristics could play an important or even predominant role in driving firm performance. Instead, influencing the CEO input may simply be the

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

148

[Vol. 99

the pressure from institutional investors and governance activists is the fact
that those groups think CEO behavior is critical.
Investor pressure for CEO turnover is not the only data point that
demonstrates investors' belief in CEO importance for firm performance. As
discussed earlier, tying CEO pay to firm performance has become a bedrock
principle for shareholder activists.'72 The vast majority of performancebased pay comes in the form of equity compensation explicitly linking a
CEO's financial outcome with share price."' Unless CEO behavior has a
profound effect on firm value though, the relationship between share price
and CEO performance becomes attenuated, and the case for awarding
equity compensation largely falls apart.174
Moreover, there is a broader set of anecdotal evidence showing the way
in which CEOs' personal behavior-their traits, talents, and actions-has
become the primary indicator of firm performance for shareholders and the
public generally. Khurana, for instance, describes the rise of the cult of the
charismatic CEO in recent years.17 5 In his account, CEOs are no longer
6
seen as simply managers, but rather as "visonar[ies]" and "evangelist[s]."'
The rise of the business press, with its own set of incentives for easily
digestible, sexy, and moralistic explanations for complex business issues,
and the increasing importance of analysts hoping to be interviewed by that
business press, has further focused attention on the personal characteristics
of CEOs and the candidates to replace them.'77 The more attention that
is lavished on CEOs and potential CEOs, the more impact they seem to
have on the firms they lead and, most importantly, the more that slight
differences between CEO alternatives become magnified.
It is not even essential that institutional shareholders believe in the
significance of firm performance effects among CEO alternatives. These
investors need only to expect that other market participants hold such
views and consequently that differences between CEO alternatives
will drive firm value, at least in the short run.s7 The best evidence that
biggest, most accessible lever that they can press given their positional limitations. Even this
more modest position, however, is sufficient to show that shareholders feel that CEOs matter
very much.
172 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been,
How lVe Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 35-37 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=561305.

174 See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: ManagerialPower Versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 847, 857 (2002) (questioning the basis for
awarding equity compensation to employees who cannot affect share prices).
175 KHURANA, Supra note Io, at 69-80.
176 Id. at 71177 Id. at 73-8o.

178 For more on the view that investors are predicting the behavior of other investors

201I0- 201II

]

SAY ON PAY

149

investors take CEO performance seriously, then, is the numerous studies
that demonstrate the effect of CEO hiring and departure announcements
on share prices."'
If shareholders perceive a strong link between CEO quality and firm
performance, they will be reluctant to risk offending CEOs in a way that
may harm firm performance. The costs of offending will obviously be
higher at high-performing firms. A negative Say on Pay vote is therefore
likely bundled with, and, at high-performing firms, dominated by its
potential collateral effects on CEO behavior. A skeptic might note that this
domination extends to compensation decisions more broadly." That is,
compensation cost concerns are always dwarfed by executive performance
concerns even if the decision is made on an exantebasis.It is incontrovertible
that shareholders prefer expensive stars to inexpensive mediocrities. As
discussed in Part III, however, there are advantages in having an ex ante
mechanism even if shareholders' preferences require that the discipline
ultimately meted out is relatively modest.
3. Say on Pay's Discipline Prior to Determining Pay.-The argument to

this point has been that an ex post Say on Pay vote will be distorted by
bundled collateral costs at high-performing firms. Say on Pay's proponents,
however, do not place particular importance on shareholders' ex post voting
decisions. Rather, they believe the measure's promise lies in its ability to
shape board behavior prior to entering into compensation arrangements
with executives."' In order to avoid the embarrassment and complications
created by an adverse vote in the future, boards and executives should
comply with shareholder demands in shaping pay packages at the outset.
This compliance could involve actual communication with shareholders
or their advisors or adherence to whichever generalized guidelines they
promulgate. If true, shareholders are never forced to use their Say on Pay
voting power and are therefore not truly faced with the bundling issues

described above.
Even in this idealized case, however, bundling will pose a problem
because it makes less credible the base threat that animates boards'
willingness to negotiate with shareholders ahead of time. The less credible
the ultimate voting threat is, the less reason managers (and boards and

irrespective of fundamental valuation, see id. at 79-80.

179 See, e.g., Matthew J. Clayton, Jay C. Hartzell & Joshua Rosenberg. The Impact of
CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility 1-3 (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), availableat
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=222788; Eugene P.H. Furtado & Vijay
Karan, Causes, Consequences, and Shareholder Wealth Effects of M4anagement Turnover: A Review of
the EmpiricalEvidence, 19 FIN. MGMT. 6o (1990) (reviewing studies).
180 But see discussion supra Part IL.A for more on the case for disciplining pay at highperforming firms.
181 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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the executives with which they are negotiating) have to comply with
shareholder demands early in the process.
The threat of an adverse vote will be less credible ex ante in at least two
cases given the vote's bundled costs.' First, if managers are optimistic
about the firm's prospects, they will assume the firm will be among the high
performers and therefore discount the likelihood of future adverse Say on
Pay votes.'8 3 Second, even more conservative managers will nevertheless
be able to discount the shareholder threat that yields ex ante shareholder
influence. The structure of compensation contracts allows boards and
executives to allocate compensation rewards among different performance
scenarios. By doing so, they can enforce discipline in downside scenarios,
where the potential for later shareholder discipline is high. But in the upside
scenarios, boards and executives will be unconstrained by any shareholder
influence because they anticipate the significant bundling problems facing
shareholders in the high-performance situation. Bundled collateral costs
are thus able to fully explain the inability of Say on Pay to impact pay
at high-performing firms during both periods in which discipline might
otherwise be meted out.18
III. Ex ANTE

SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF

CEO

COMPENSATION PLANS

The bundling problem described in Part II is a result of the timing of
the Say on Pay vote. Largely because the vote occurs after a performance
period and after a CEO has been chosen, Say on Pay will struggle to
constrain pay at high-performing firms. The solution, obviously, is to push
the discipline mechanism to a period prior to the point at which a vote
could offend managers. One possibility along this line would be to require
shareholders to approve a CEO Compensation Plan ahead of the process
in which a firm recruits and hires its new CEO."'The adopted plan would

182 Additionally, if the CEO-to-be is aware of the shareholder demands at this ex ante
stage, he or she may be offended. For more on this point, see infra Part III.A.
183 For more on managers' excessive optimism, see, e.g., Barnard,supra note 160, at 41315.
184 The later timing of the Say on Pay vote may also permit shareholders to defect from
commitments they made to managers at the ex ante stage. This inability to bond shareholders
could cause managers to discount the benefit of getting ex ante shareholder approval. If so, the
discounting would not necessarily lead to less discipline at high-performing firms than poorperforming firms. Instead, the ability to defect caused by the time lag between shareholder
promise and shareholder vote would call into question the ability of Say on Pay to impose
any discipline at all. But the data from the UK indicates that Say on Pay has had an impact on
poor-performing firms, arguably the firms most likely to fear shareholder defection. See supra
Part I.A.
185 This proposal could easily be expanded to a "Top 5 Executive Compensation Plan,"
and there is no reason to necessarily limit its purview to CEO pay. This Part does so only for
ease of exposition.
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set out compensation-related terms for anyone hired to the post for some
period of time following its adoption, and the plan vote could not be shifted
to an earlier time to exploit the bundling effects described above.' The
remainder of this Part develops this mechanism and suggests that it is
largely preferable to Say on Pay.
A. Startingfrom the Equity Compensation P/an Listing Requirements
A point in Say on Pay's favor is that it has already been adopted in
the UK and proposed at a number of US companies and, in both cases,
has not led to disastrous results. Although proposals to adopt Say on Pay
at individual US firms seem to be driven by firm size rather than quality
of pay practices,'" those proposals have generally not been approved by
shareholders.'" In the UK, where Say on Pay is mandatory at most firms,
it seems to have affected only those with poor pay practices.'" Even if Say
on Pay is limited to affecting only firms with poor pay practices and poor
performance, the fact that it has not wreaked havoc elsewhere is not to be
dismissed lightly given the doubts surrounding increases to shareholder
power. "
Fortunately, a CEO Compensation Plan approach is similarly situated
in that an analogous rule has been adopted-in the US, no less-and
has not caused significant damage to firms.' 9 ' Since 2003, the NYSE and
Nasdaq, as well as other exchanges, have required traded firms to submit
equity compensation plans for shareholder approval.'9 2 This rule covers any
plan under which options, restricted stock, or restricted stock unitS9 3 are

186

Equity plans tend to expire after io years. See Valarie L. Mclnroy, Horace L. Nash

& Scott P. Spector, ShareholderApproval Requiredfor Equity Compensation Plans, TMARTINDALE.

(July 17, 2003), http://www.martindale.com/secirities-law/article_Fenwick-WestLLP_19744.htm. Presumably, the CEO Compensation Plan would be voted on more frequently, perhaps every three or five years, similar to the most relaxed requirement for Say
on Pay votes under Dodd-Frank. See Pub. L. No. 11 1-203, § 951(a)(i), 12 Stat. 1376, 1899
cOM

(2010).

187 Cai & Walkling, supra note i5 (manuscript at 31-33).
188 Id. at 33.
189 See Ferri & Maber, supra note 50, at 21 -25.
190 See supra Part L.A (Say on Pay's benign effects); supra Part L.B (concerns over increased shareholder role).
191 While it is important not to overstate the advantage of using a US example as precedent, there are differences between US and UK corporate governance which may militate in
favor of a tried-and-true domestic approach. See supra note 54.
192 Lund, supra note 78, at 126. Prior to 2003, firms only had to receive shareholder approval under listing standards if the plans were not "broadly-based." Id. at 124. For more on
the history of the equity compensation-related listing standards, see id. at 124-27.
193 N.Y. STOCK Excu., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.o8 (2005), available at http://
nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ (follow "Section 303 A.oo" hyperlink; then follow "3o3A.o8
Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensation Plans" hyperlink). Restricted stock unit grants
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distributed.194 Those equity-related components of pay make up a sizable
portion of the annual compensation paid to top executives,1" though the
rules apply even to plans that pay all or most of the equity to lower-level
employees.' 96 By prohibiting equity compensation from being paid under
non-approved plans, the rule effectively makes the shareholder vote
binding and gives shareholders significant authority over a large portion of
executive compensation.
This reallocation of authority has not produced particularly terrible
consequences."9 The rule proposed in this Part would be broader than
the equity plan-related listing requirements in that it would cover all
compensation paid toCEOs rather than just equity-based compensation.On
the other hand, it would be narrower than the current listing requirements
in that compensation approval would only be required for the CEO or a
small group of executives.
Building on the ex ante equity compensation approval example would
largely avoid the bundling issues described in Part II. Pushing the
discipline decision forward would make its application unlikely to offend
any potential CEO and should therefore allow shareholders to express
their true compensation preferences. To ensure this depersonalization, the
CEO Compensation Plan would have to be proposed and approved prior
to the onset of a CEO search process. 9 8 If it occurred later, the potential for
offending candidates would become higher as the vote could still be seen
as candidate-specific. The likelihood of offense in such situations would
depend on the public information regarding candidates,'" but could be
are covered only to the extent the value of such units can be paid out in shares. Id.
194 Excepted from the approval requirement are (i) inducement awards; (2) conversions, replacements, or adjustments of outstanding options or other equity compensation
awards when necessary to reflect an acquisition and post-acquisition grants using shares available under acquired plans; and (3) 401(a) plans (e.g., ESOPs), 423 plans, and parallel excess
plans. Id.
195 See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paidlike Bureaucrats?,
I 13 Q.J. EcoN. 653, 655 (1998).
196 In this way, the rules differ from historical rules that exempted broad-based plans.
For more on the history of the listing requirements, see Lund, supra note 78, at 124-30.
197 See Cai & Walkling, supra note 15 (manuscript at 35-36) (showing that pay-performance sensitivity and abnormal CEO pay drive shareholder voting on equity compensation
plans).
198 For example, shareholders could be required to approve a plan every two years with
the newly-approved plan becoming effective six months after the approval in order to prevent
bundling in the event of a contemporaneous CEO search.
199 In addition to avoiding bundling problems, this point distinguishes the CEO
Compensation Plan proposal from others that would require shareholder approval of an already negotiated but not yet effective CEO employment contract. Gordon, for instance,
criticizes such proposals as unworkable because a company's "inability to offer a definitive
contract would significantly impair the recruitment efforts, both because of the uncertainty
and the possible embarrassment of a negative shareholder vote." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive
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effectively negated by requiring approval well ahead of time.
B. The ContinuingProblem of InternalCandidateFavoritesand Incumbents'
ContractExtensions
Before discussing potential problems in replacing Say on Pay with an
ex ante shareholder approval requirement, the latter's limitations should be
made clear. The CEO Compensation Plan approval requirement would
not always solve the bundling problems discussed above. Ex ante approval
avoids those distortions only if the voting shareholders are ignorant of
potential CEO candidates. Otherwise, they may anticipate that their actions
could be taken personally by any candidate who eventually becomes an
actual candidate. The advantages of ex ante shareholder approval are largely
dissipated, then, if there is no way to effectively shield the identity of the
future CEO.
This will be the case most often where internal succession is anticipated,
given the obvious problems created by publicly telegraphing the candidacy
of someone external to the firm3." Whether the arrangement involves reupping with incumbent CEOs or promoting heirs apparent, shareholders
will experience the same kind of concerns about executive offense and
subsequent deviation that they would under Say on Pay. Of course, those
issues will not be worse under an ex ante approval than under Say on Pay.
Still, if CEO overcompensation is largely a function of managerial
power,'201 then the inability to effectively constrain incumbent renegotiations
or heir apparent elevations at high-performing firms-instances where
the manager-to-be would be expected to have the most power over the
board-would be troubling. At the very least, it would tend to reduce the
importance of switching from an ex post voting mechanism to an ex ante
one. In fact, however, there is good reason to think that the internal CEO
compensation market is less in need of shareholder discipline than the
external one. Increased hiring of CEOs from outside the firm is correlated
with increased CEO pay, as external hires are generally paid more than

Compensation: If There's a Problem, What's the Remedy? The Casefor "CompensationDiscussion and
Analysis," 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 699 (2005) [hereinafter Gordon, CD&A]. Needless to say, the
CEO Compensation Plan would not disable a board from reaching a definitive contract with
a CEO candidate but would merely set the parameters of such a contract. These constraints
may nonetheless impair recruitment efforts by disabling the board from attracting candidates,
a point that is addressed in more detail below. See discussion infra Part III.D.
aoo For instance, the external candidate's current employer would likely penalize the
candidate during his or her remaining time with that firm. Consequently, the external candidate will not want his or her interest in the position becoming public such that the hiring
firm's shareholders would develop an expectation. For more on the external CEO hiring process, see KHURANA, supra note Io, at 44-48.
201 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAYWITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 5, at 61.
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internal hires."' Of even greater concern than relatively high absolute
levels of compensation, "pay-for-luck" is more prevalent in industries
with greater levels of external CEO hiring.z03 Thus, while there is certainly
the potential for internal hires to be excessively compensated, a discipline
mechanism that fails to constrain that excess may nevertheless significantly
improve economy-wide pay practices if it were able to effectively constrain
compensation for external hires.
A more difficult version of this problem starts from the proposition
that it is difficult, during a CEO's tenure, for shareholders to anticipate
anyone else being named a CEO. Despite the increased volatility of CEO
employment 2 0 there may be a natural tendency to assume every CEO
Compensation Plan that one is asked to approve will ultimately be applied
to the sitting CEO. If so, there would be little advantage, in terms of the
bundling problem, of switching to an ex ante as opposed to ex post plan.
This may mean that the plan approved by shareholders should be explicitly
inapplicableto a sitting CEO's future compensation. To the extent a CEO
remains in office for an extended period, this would make discipline via the
CEO Compensation Plan relatively infrequent. 05
202 Kevin J. Murphy & JAn Zibojnfk, ManagerialCapitaland the Marketfor CEOs 26-28
(Queen's University, Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. I 110, 2007), availableat http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=984376 [hereinafter Murphy & Zibojnfk, Managerial
Capital] (finding that increasing the level of external hiring from 15% of all hires to 25% of
all hires results in a 13% wage increase for CEOs and that external hires earn 15.3% more
than internal hires). Murphy and Zdbojnik hypothesize that an increase in the importance of
general managerial ability, as opposed to firm-specific managerial ability, has lead to both a
greater demand for external candidates and a greater ability of CEOs to obtain the lion's share
of the rents created by their ability. Id. at 3-4. There are other plausible explanations for the
increased prevalence of external hires and elevated CEO compensation. See, for example,
supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text in which the importance of the business press
and securities analysts and their respective incentives for focusing on a CEO's personal traits
is described. Murphy and Zdbojnik admit that "Ilesting our propositions directly requires a
proxy for the relative importance of general managerial skills [but] we cannot currently construct such a proxy." Murphy & Zibojnik, ManagerialCapital,supra, at 24. Regardless, their
analysis does show that external hires are generally paid more than internal hires. For other
research demonstrating the correlation between external CEO hiring and CEO compensation, see Martijn Cremers & Yaniv Grinstein, The Afarket for CEO Talent: Implicationsfor CEO
Compensation 17-18 (3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, Yale ICF

Working Paper No. og-i I, 20o), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract= i1o8761; Murphy, supra
note 174, at 853-54.
203 See Cremers & Grinstein, supra note 202, at I. Cremers and Grinstein, similar to
Murphy and Zdbojnik, conclude that this represents rents extracted by external hires based
on their superior bargaining position. Id. at 29. It stands in stark contrast, therefore, to Bebchuk
and Fried's managerial power hypothesis. Id. Cremers and Grinstein further conclude, similarly to Murphy and Zgbojnik, that this position is a function of CEOs' non-firm-specific skill
levels. Id.
204 Kaplan & Minton, supranote 169, at I.
205 Conceivably, a CEO Compensation Plan could complement Say on Pay, with the
former presenting an unbundled choice and the latter presenting more frequent, if imperfect,
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C. Would CEO Compensation Plans be Too Constraining?
Although an ex ante approval mechanism might be preferable to Say on
Pay for bundling reasons, there may be other ways in which it falls short.
For instance, an ex ante approval requirement might shift too much power
to shareholders. This would be particularly troubling for those who already
have concerns about increasing shareholder power through Say on Pay."
Equity plan approvals are binding on firms under the exchange rules. If it
were better to limit shareholder power and retain board authority, then a
binding ex ante vote would certainly be worse than an advisory ex post one.
Adopting an ex ante mechanism like a CEO Compensation Plan approval
requirement, however, does not require adoption of every feature of the
equity compensation plan rules. The CEO Compensation Plan vote
could be advisory just like Say on Pay. In addition, a non-binding CEO
Compensation Plan approval requirement would be no worse than a nonbinding Say on Pay vote in terms of inappropriately tying boards' hands.
Take one argument against increased shareholder involvement in the
compensation process: time and resource-strapped investors (or their
agents) may resort to one-size-fits-all guidelines that will likely prove
inefficient for some set of firms. 20 1 Wary of this outcome, Jeffrey Gordon
advocates for allowing shareholders to opt in to Say on Pay."' While allowing
shareholders to opt in to or out of disciplinary measures like Say on Pay is
probably advisable 21 a CEO Compensation Plan approval requirement
obviates much of the need for an opt-out device. Shareholders can "optout" of compensation micromanagement by limiting the requirements
they impose on CEO pay packages. Shareholders reluctant to constrain
board behavior could allow liberal plans while those wishing a greater say
over compensation could be relatively stricter.
As discussed in Part II, Say on Pay can impose discipline at two
distinct points in time: at or around the time of the ex post vote or prior
to pay decisions (but based on the threat of ex post sanctions). Regarding
discipline at the time of the vote, the ability to implicitly opt-out under
a CEO Compensation Plan approval rule is more effective because it
allows shareholders to tailor the scope of their opting out. Under Say on
Pay with an opt-out provision, shareholders are always faced with a series
of imprecise binary choices between opting in and out and, if the former,

discipline.
206 See supra Part LB.
207 See, e.g., Gordon,supra note 8, at 325-26; Lund, supra note 78, at 157.
208 Gordon, supra note 8, at 326.
209 See, e.g., Andrew C.W. Lund, Opting Out of Good Faith,37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 393 (20 IO)

(describing the traditional argument for private ordering within the firm and suggesting that
shareholders be able to exculpate directors for actions taken "not in good faith").
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discipline and no discipline.z"o
The problem is softened if one assumes ex ante negotiations under a Say
on Pay rule. Shareholders could tailor their ex ante demands as appropriate,
wielding the threat of ultimately voting against the package at the ex post
point."' Yet even compared with these ex ante negotiations, the CEO
Compensation Plan approval rule should be preferred by those in favor of
private ordering. First, the CEO Compensation Plan requirement simply
formalizes the favored negotiation process. 1 z Second, the reliance on an
informal ex ante negotiation permits defection by shareholders at the time
of the later Say on Pay vote. Shareholders who privately agreed that a
particular arrangement was appropriate at T retain the ability under Say on
Pay to condemn the arrangement later on. Moreover, given any significant
level of shareholder turnover between the time of ex ante informal approval
and the ex post vote, a new shareholder base may not feel constrained by
their predecessors' informal approval. In this way, shareholders are arguably
more capable of mucking up compensation arrangements under Say on
Pay, even assuming shareholder influence ahead of the vote.
In sum, an advisory CEO Compensation Plan approval requirement
would be no more constraining on board authority than Say on Pay. If
anything, ex ante approval should be comforting (relative to Say on Pay) to
those who are skeptical of increased shareholder power. The only exception
to this general point is that some of those who would resist shareholder
power may be willing, in the face of its inevitability, to settle for a version
vulnerable to the bundling effects described herein. That is, Say on Pay
may be favored by those that want as little shareholder discipline as possible
because it only affects a subset of firms.
D. Would CEO Compensation Plans be ConstrainingEnough?
Similarly, an advisory CEO Compensation Plan approval requirement
should not be less constrainingthan Say on Pay. Most obviously, the bundling
improvements occasioned by the move to an ex ante vote should encourage
more discipline on compensation matters at high-performing firms than
under Say on Pay. But that does not necessarily mean that expost discipline
will be more significant than ex ante discipline across all firms.
For instance, the rule requiring shareholder approval of equity
compensation plans - largely the model for this Part's proposal - has been
21o There are reasons to doubt the ability of proxy firms to make firm-specific Say on
Pay decisions. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. But the difficulty also exists with
firm-specific decisions on whether to opt-in to Say on Pay. See supra note 85.
211 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 34, at 20.
212 The CEO Compensation Plan approval mechanism becomes more compelling when
one considers the bargaining and bundling problems with contemporaneous trilateral negotiations.
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criticized as not being tough enough on pay practices."' Bebchuk and Fried
point to three problematic aspects of equity compensation plan approval.
First, they note the level of generality at which the proposed plans operate.
The equity plans approved by shareholders, as a rule, do not include details
about particular executives' payouts and therefore "[sIhareholders cannot
reject or approve a particular executive's pay package."2 1 1 Second, Bebchuk
and Fried note that shareholders who might like to disapprove of proposed
plans are caught between a rock and a hard place. Although they may not
like some of the terms of the proposed equity plans, approving a "bad"
plan is still better for shareholders given the consequences-managerial
departures, less performance-based compensation, adverse tax effectsof a defeated plan.2 m Finally, Bebchuk and Fried observe the structural
problems attendant to shareholder voting. 1 6
Of course, the important question for present purposes is whether these
problems, assuming they are significant, are made worse because equity
plan approval is given ex ante. On this count, Bebchuk and Fried support
giving shareholders a binding vote over certain "suspect" compensation
features. 21 Given the logistical problems of an ex post binding vote, the
approval for which they advocate must be ex ante. Thus, Bebchuk and
Fried's criticism of equity compensation plan approval is not a criticism of
its timing but rather of other features."'
213 BEBCIIUK & FRIED, PAY WrITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 5, at 48-51.

214 Id. at 49.

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50-51.
217 Id. at 198 ("In our view, it would be desirable to permit shareholders to initiate and
215

216

approve binding rules for executive compensation arrangements.").
218 To elaborate, take two of the three sets of criticisms leveled by Bebchuk
and Fried at equity compensation approvals. First, their general concerns regarding the efficacy of shareholder activism through voting are equally applicable to Say
on Pay as they would be to an ex ante CEO Compensation Plan approval requirement.
See id. at 48-51. If shareholders rationally accede to management wishes as a result of
the incentive structure created by dispersed shareholder voting in equity compensation plan votes, there seems little reason to expect more discipline via Say on Pay
Second, Bebchuk and Fried's acknowledgment of the collateral consequences of shareholder votes against equity compensation plans counsels in favor of an ex ante mechanism.
If collateral consequences of adverse Say on Pay votes are significant because of bundling
problems, see supra Part II.B.2, an ex ante approval mechanism would be preferable for the
reasons stated earlier. Along this line, Bebchuk and Fried specifically point out the potential for managerial departures based on adverse equity compensation plan votes, which is
much greater under Say on Pay than under a CEO Compensation Plan approval rule. While
Bebchuk and Fried's concern for managerial departures seems to be driven by the preclsive nature of an adverse, binding equity compensation plan vote, see BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 5, at 49 ("When shareholder ratification of a plan is essential
to executive retention, vetoing the plan might well lead to a management crisis.") (emphasis
added), that does not detract from the potential for collateral damage occasioned by an advisory but more CEO-specific adverse vote.
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Nevertheless, at least one of the criticisms of equity compensation plan
approvals-the level of generality at which the matters to be approved by
shareholders are specified in proposed plans-might apply more forcefully
to ex ante mechanisms like a CEO Compensation Plan rule than expostones
like Say on Pay. The former are more likely to need to operate at some
level of generality given the impossibility of predicting every potential
term demanded by future CEO candidates and the advisability of granting
the board some flexibility in negotiation. Of course, the difference may not
be appreciable if Say on Pay's most significant effect is to force boards to
informally negotiate with shareholders in conjunction with or prior to the
board's negotiations with a candidate anyway.
But the room for maneuvering required by an ex ante mechanism need
not be capacious. It would be surprising, for instance, if CEO Compensation
Plans turned out to be as generalized as equity compensation plans.The most
significant complaint about the generality at which equity compensation
plans govern is that no plan specifies which employee gets what amount
of equity compensation, leaving the vital matter of allocation up to the
board.219 Shareholders are able to demand such specificity, but it makes no
sense to do so, given the size of the class of recipients. CEO Compensation
Plans, on the other hand, would be applicable to a much smaller group of
executives, permitting shareholders to set position-specific terms if they
so wished. Conceivably, shareholders might feel reluctant to give stringent
guidance without greater information about the prospective CEO candidate
so as not to prevent the firm from attracting him or her. It is hard to imagine
this is a significant problem, however, given (a) institutional holders' and
proxy advisors' willingness to promulgate one-size-fits-all guidelines in an
ex post environment and (b) the expectation that boards would approach
shareholders and their advisors as necessary to negotiate deviations from
the pre-approved plans.
Indeed, the evidence from equity plan approvals gives reason to expect
shareholders would be reasonably aggressive in their demands for CEO
compensation plans, both in respect of pay levels and other terms. Thomas
and Martin conducted the most prominent study of shareholder behavior
with respect to equity plan approval and they offer a relatively sanguine
view of shareholders' ability to constrain behavior. Although the study
found that less than 1% of equity compensation plans were voted down
by shareholders during the 1998 proxy season (with average shareholder
opposition measuring 18.6%),220 these relatively low numbers do not
necessarily mean that shareholders were failing to discipline compensation.
As with Say on Pay, firms may have adjusted behavior ahead of time for

219 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note

5, at

196.

220 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on
Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 58-59 (2000).
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fear of a negative vote. 2 ' Along this line, Thomas and Martin found
that shareholder opposition was correlated with certain features of the
plans-the level of dilution resulting from the plans, the ability of plans
to automatically replenish themselves, their permitting option repricing or
discounted options-suggesting that shareholders were able to coordinate
their voting behavior in opposition to particular terms. 2 1
Moreover, given the bargaining leverage gained by CEO candidates
by the time the pay package is negotiated and the likely perception of
shareholders that a skilled CEO is worth more than the marginal dollar
(or million) in compensation cost, shareholders should recognize that
any publicly announced advisory vote will likely become a floor for
negotiations between the board and the candidate. The failure to impose
constraints via the plan may be taken as a signal to boards and candidates
that the shareholders have no preferences at all. Therefore, shareholders
will have the incentive to set limits that are likely to be more restrictive
than their reservation price (in terms of approving a pay package), with the
understanding that boards will exceed those limits if necessary to attract
a preferred candidate."3 While deviation from the shareholder-approved
plan might therefore be relatively common, the shareholder advice could
still have a salutary effect. By setting a baseline, boards would be given
some leverage in CEO negotiations to avoid egregious deviations and any
deviations would be publicly recognized as such and require explanation.
Proponents of Say on Pay contend that an adverse vote can provide
a point of information for shareholder activists considering action against
directors.224 A CEO Compensation Plan rule, by itself, does not accomplish
this end, though this can be easily remedied. Because CEO compensation
See, e.g., Lund, supra note 78, at 134-36.
Thomas & Martin, supra note 220, at 71. Interestingly, Thomas and Martin also
found that shareholder voting was more positive for poorly-performingcompanies. See id. at
61-62. This can largely be explained by shareholder desire to give increased incentives to
poorly-performing managers, but it further indicates that an ex ante approach will not suffer
from bundling concerns.
223 Investors, alternatively, could simply abstain from setting pay limits, recognizing
their implicit expectation that the board would deviate from the limits. On the other hand,
the absence of limits, given the shareholders' new ability to set them, might signal to boards
and candidates that absolute compensation does not matter to shareholders. To avoid this,
shareholders would have to play the game of setting and enforcing limits as described.
224 See Cai & Walkling, supra note 15 (manuscript at 7). RiskMetrics' voting guidelines
anticipate such a process:
221

222

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the
primary focus of voting on executive pay practices - dissatisfaction with
compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather
than withholding or voting against the compensation committee .... In
addition, ... if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior
MSOP proposal, then vote withhold or against compensation committee
members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors).
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arrangements are material contracts, they must be publicly filed on
Form 8-K.2 5 To the extent that this normal disclosure might not serve to
clearly signal a particular deviation from the shareholder-approved terms,
disclosure rules could be amended to require firms to publicly state that
they have deviated and offer reasons for doing so.
Similarly, Say on Pay may do more than signal something about firm
governance. Adverse Say on Pay votes impose reputational costs on
directors and executives at firms.22 6 Indeed, these reputational costs are the
basis for the bundling problems described earlier. An advisory ex ante plan
approval would differ insofar as it would not necessarily allow for a lowcost, high-humiliation vote. Because it is relatively easy to make violations
of shareholder-approved plans public, however, the CEO Compensation
Plan rule would provide at least some reputational sanctions for directors
as Say on Pay.
The problem is admittedly exacerbated if the approved CEO
Compensation Plan explicitly excludes the sitting CEO from its application
to avoid bundling concerns."' Even there, though, it is unclear that Say
on Pay adds very much to the humiliation-inducing tools at hand for
shareholders. In fact, the ability to shame via Say on Pay seems largely
duplicative of the shaming capacity of "vote-no" campaigns in director
elections. 2 It may be that more opportunities for shareholders to express
frustration are better than fewer, but it is at least worth wondering why
shareholders need another alternative for embarrassing managers.2 29 Like
Say on Pay, withhold the vote campaigns against directors are subject to
bundling problems, with the bundled costs being the losses engendered
by switching from one set of directors to another.23 0 In fact, some have
suggested that Say on Pay has an advantage over director-election-related
RISKMETRICS GRP., 20Io GUIDELINES,

stpra note 124, at 38.

Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 17 C.FR. § 229-402
225

(2oo6).

226 Jeffrey Gordon has previously analogized Say on Pay votes to "just vote no" campaigns against directors, though not specifically as catalysts for shareholder revolt. Gordon,

CD&A, supra note 199, at 677.
227 See supra note 212, and accompanying text.
228 See Gordon, CD&A, supra note 199, at 701 ("If the goal is to provide a vehicle for
broader mobilization of popular and elite opinion, the targeted 'just vote no' [campaign] may
be almost as effective."); see also RISKMETRICS GRP., 20o0 GUIDELINES,Supra note 124, at 38

("[Ifthere is no [say on pay vote] on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members
of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases . . . then vote withhold or
against compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all
directors).").
229 Alternatively, Say on Pay proponents might argue that an expost mechanism invites
hindsight bias and that such bias is actually helpful insofar as shareholders might systematically err in favor of higher compensation packages if only presented with an ex ante choice.
230 See, e.g., Camara, supra note 157, at 1450-54.
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activism in that it allows shareholders to express dissatisfaction while
still retaining valuable directors."' But this seems to get the bundling
question backwards. While it may be true that Say on Pay creates fewer
director-related bundling issues than resort to director elections, it seems
extraordinary to think that shareholders are more concerned about the costs
of losing directors than the costs of losing a CEO."'
Finally, even if shareholders value directors at high-performing firms
equally with CEOs, there is disciplinary value obtained by moving to
an ex ante approval. The CEO Compensation Plan mechanism forces any
board violation to be publicly acknowledged and declared as such. Any
bundling concerns surrounding disciplining directors come after the public
announcement, meaning that directors incur reputational costs even if
bundling concerns ensure that shareholders will never remove them from
office. Say on Pay, on the other hand, makes the event that would impose
the reputational costs on directors-the Say on Pay vote-itself contingent
on shareholder decisionmaking under the influence of the bundling effects
such that there may never be an embarrassing moment.
CoNCLusIoN

Even before passage of Dodd-Frank, it was more or less apparent that
executive compensation would be subjected to enhanced shareholder
influence in the near future. The debate over this change's merits is likely
to prove intractable in the short term, though evidence from Say on Pay's
adoption in the UK indicates that increased shareholder power will not pose
serious downside risks to US firms. Progress can be made, however, toward
the optimal design of the mechanism for increasing shareholder power.
Say on Pay has become the dominant version of increasing shareholder
influence over compensation decisions, but both intuition and observed
results in the UK show that Say on Pay is a limited disciplinary device,
particularly with respect to high-performing firms.
Luckily, some of the problems with Say on Pay that lead to this skewing
away from discipline for certain firms are mostly fixable via something
like a CEO Compensation Plan rule, It is impossible to determine
how powerful the bundling issues described above are relative to other
plausible explanations, particularly the possibility that shareholders
wrongly misperceive the cost of excess compensation in high-performance
situations. But even if that misperception is more important to the observed
phenomena than is argued here, it is still the case that an ex ante vote is
preferable to an expost one.
Ironically, the best argument in favor of Say on Pay is that it accidentally
231 Ertimur et al., supranote 145, at 5 & n.2.

232 See supra notes 166-81 and accompanying text (describing the central role attributed
to CEOs by shareholders).
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limits discipline at high-performing firms. Needless to say, accidental
mistakes are not particularly good candidates for saving. Perhaps the
retention of Say on Pay, despite its problems, indicates that some of those
pushing for greater shareholder power over executive compensation may
not be entirely convinced that such an increase is a good idea. More likely,
the laser-like focus on Say on Pay as the mechanism for introducing
shareholder power is simply a mistake and one that should be remedied
sooner than later.

